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COMMENT
THE CREATION OF A COMMON LAW RULE: THE
FELLOW SERVANT RULE, 1837-1860
INTRODUCTION

Searching for a comprehensive explanation of the nature of legal
change is like searching for an honest man: the quest is often more
illuminating than the conclusion. The quest has recently been undertaken by a new generation of legal historians who have focused upon
the development of modern private law doctrines in nineteenth-century
America.' One such doctrine, the Fellow Servant rule, presents a stark
and self-contained example of common law development. This Comment examines the development of the rule to see if such an examination can clarify the interplay between competing explanations of nineteenth-century legal change.
The Fellow Servant rule was a rule of tort law created in the midnineteenth century. It carved out an exception to the well-established
rule of respondeat superior, and relieved employers of liability for injuries negligently inflicted by any employee upon a "fellow servant." The
rule did not exist until 1837, when it was first pronounced in England
by Lord Abinger in Priestleyv. Fowler.2 In 1842 Chief Justice Lemuel
Shaw of Massachiusetts gave the rule its American reception and rationale in the leading case of Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Rail
Road.- By 1880 the rule, in one form or another, was so firmly entrenched in nearly every American jurisdiction that late nineteenth-century treatise writers warned legislatures and courts against tampering
with "a rule of the common law, based upon the wisdom and precedents of the ages." 4
1 See, e.g., M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 17801860 (1977); G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA (1980); Feinman, The Development
of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 118 (1976); Schwartz, Tort
Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE
L.J. 1717 (1981).
2 150 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1032-33 (1837).
3 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
4 1 E. WHITE, LAW OF PERSONAL INJURIES ON RAILROADS 417 (1909); see also
M. BIGELOW, LAW OF TORTS 707 (1875). By 1854, barely 12 years after Farwell, the
railroad attorney in the first Illinois Fellow Servant case blandly asserted that "[t]he
general rule, that the master is not liable for injuries sustained by one servant through
the wrongful act or negligence of another, is established by the overwhelming weight ot
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Commentators have used the rule to illustrate conflicting theories
concerning the nature of legal development. These writers fall into two
broad categories: those who view legal change largely as a function of
the legal community's response to social and economic changes in society, and those who see it primarily as a response to forces within the
legal community.
The clearest, and perhaps simplest, explanation is that of the economic and social determinists. They view legal development, in general,
as a product of the legal system's close adaption to changes in society.
To such theorists the Fellow Servant rule is an example of the general
development of tort law in the direction of protecting nascent industry
in an industrializing society.5
The major new version of this interpretation is that of Morton J.
Horwitz.' While previous economic and social determinists depicted legal change largely as a passive response to changes in society at large,
Horwitz's exhaustive study of the changes in American private law in
the nineteenth-century describes a conscious effort by the legal establishment "to promote economic growth primarily through the legal...
system."" To Horwitz, nineteenth-century common law judges were deliberate and conscious sources of legal change, purposefully shaping
private law to accommodate the needs of their social and economic
partners in the entrepreneurial classes.' To these "instrumentalist"
judges, the private law was malleable. Their role was to mold it by
discarding or reshaping ancient common law doctrines and English
precedents and thereby to render the nineteenth-century legal system
consonant with the social and economic needs of an industrializing
authority." Honner v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 15 Ill.
550 (1854) (citations omitted).
8 A premier advocate of the view that nineteenth-century tort law is an example
of the passive response of the legal system to changes in society at large is Laurence
Friedman. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 262 (1973); see
also J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 4-6 (1967); Friedman & Ladinsky, Social
Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967). For an
approving view of common law adaptability, see McClain, Legal Change and Class
Interests: A Review Essay on Morton Horwitz's 'The Transformation of American
Law,' 68 CALIF. L. REV. 382, 396-97 (1980) ("[tlhese changes appear to reflect the
legal order's responsiveness to changed social conditions and its ability to evolve in the
direction of greater flexibility, greater materiality, and, indeed, greater plain common
sense").
6 M. HORWrrz, supra note 1.
Id. at xv.
S See id. at 30, 253-54. As McClain notes, "[t]he Horwitz thesis is therefore one
that posits orchestrated and purposive legal change." McClain, supra note 5, at 39192. The theme of purposive legal change predated Horwitz. See, e.g., Rabin, Some
Thoughts on Tort Law from a SociopoliticalPerspective, 1969 WIs. L. REV. 51, 60-62
(discussing formulation of legal doctrines affecting liability for injuries from industrial
accidents and defective products).
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America.9
Central to Horwitz's thesis is a stringent periodization; Horwitz
separates the early nineteenth-century period of dynamic legal change
from the static eighteenth-century world which preceded it and from
the late nineteenth-century era of legal formalism which followed it
when the triumphant entrepreneurial classes sought to consolidate the
gains they had won earlier."0 For Horwitz, the development of the Fellow Servant rule exemplified the process by which instrumentalist
judges like Lemuel Shaw molded private law in the early nineteenth
century to accommodate the needs of the entrepreneurial classes.,
A far different perspective on nineteenth-century legal change, and
on the Fellow Servant rule, is presented by those scholars who view
legal development not as a reaction to social and economic change, but
rather primarily as a response to intellectual forces within the legal
community itself. 2 While social change may have provided the occasion
9 M. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 1-30; see also Rabin, supra note 8, at 56 ("The
judicial concern was to allocate resources optimally in light of perceptions of the 'publie' dimension of the problem; in other words, in view of the societal interest in encouraging industrial growth."). This activist, or instrumental, model of judicial activity,
stripped of its nineteenth-century economic substance, has recently been cited approvingly as the appropriate model for present-day common law judges. See Ursin,Judicial
Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 229, 231, 251-59, 304-08 (1981).
On the use of English precedent, see infra text accompanying notes 52-56. It is interesting to note that English commentators on the development of the Fellow Servant rule
(the doctrine of common employment) view it not as a farsighted, if harsh, accommodation of the legal system to industrial interests, but rather as a product of backwardlooking nineteenth-century judges seeking to recreate a simpler eighteenth-century
world of master-servant relationships. See Smith, Judges and the Lagging Law of Com-

pensation for Personal Injuries in the Nineteenth Century, 2 J.

LEGAL

HIST. 258

(1981).
10

M. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 1-30, 253-66. As Horwitz notes,
[t]he rise of legal formalism can be fully correlated with the attainment of
these substantive legal changes. If a flexible, instrumental conception of
law was necessary to promote the transformation of the post-revolutionary
American legal system, it was no longer needed once the major beneficiaries of that transformation had obtained the bulk of their objectives.
Indeed, once successful, those groups could only benefit if both the recent
origins and the foundations in policy and group self-interest of all newly
established legal doctrines could be disguised. There were, in short, major
advantages in creating an intellectual system which gave common law
rules the appearance of being self-contained, apolitical, and inexorable

Id. at 254.
For a critical view of Horwitz's periodization, see Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis
and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CH. L. REv. 533 (1979).
11 See M. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 201-04, 208-10, 253-54.
12 See, e.g., G. WHITE, supra note 1, at 16 (agreeing with the "conventional identification of the rise of Torts with the advent of industrialism," but characterizing its
development as "an intellectual response to the increased number of accidents involving
persons who had no preexisting relationship with one another").
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for legal change, they believe, it cannot provide a sufficient explanation
for the direction such legal development took. 1 3 Thus, for example, one
modern scholar, G. Edward White, has attributed the development of
nineteenth-century tort law largely to "changes in jurisprudential
thought."' 4 In such a scheme, the intellectual force of the arguments of
premier judges like Lemuel Shaw assumes major significance."
When considering the role of intellectual factors in impelling legal
change, it is important to remember that the intellectual process need
not result in a set of legal rules that are either consistent or coherent.
As Alan Watson notes, legal change can result from lawyers talking to
judges talking to theorists, and the result can be at odds with any particular society's social or economic needs.' 6
'" These scholars draw their inspiration from Roscoe Pound's conception that the
"[t]enacity of a taught legal tradition is much more significant in our legal history than
the economic conditions of time and place." R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF
AMERICAN LAW 82 (1938) [hereinafter cited as R. POUND, FORMATIVE ERA]. For
Pound, the Fellow Servant rule was a rational judicial response to the then-current
trend of judicial decisions toward limiting strict liability, rather than "something
adopted wilfully in 1837 by a tribunal consciously expressing in legal doctrine the self
interest of a dominant social or economic class." Pound, The Economic Interpretation
and the Law of Torts, 53 HARV. L. REV. 365, 379 (1940); see also id. at 382.
14 G. WHITE, supra note 1, at 3. White attributes the development of modern tort
law to the efforts of nineteenth-century scholars and judges, marching under the banner
of "legal science," to order and rationalize the ancient, haphazard writ system. Id. at
12, 14.
15 This view is shared by L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND
CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 167 (1957). Levy believes that the sheer force of Shaw's creativity and the inescapable intellectual rigor of his argument caused American courts to
follow Farwell. For a similar view of Shaw's influence, see Ursin, supra note 9, at
259-63.
16 See A. WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE 8 (1977). But see Abel, Law
as Lag: Inertia as a Social Theory of Law (Book Review), 80 MICH. L. REV. 785
(1982) (reviewing A. WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE (1977)); Dawson, Book
Review, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 595 (1982) (reviewing A. WATSON, THE MAKING OF
CIVIL LAW (1981)); Friedman, Book Review, 6 BRIT. J.L. & Soc. 127 (1979) (reviewing A. WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE (1977)). Such criticism is beyond
the scope of this Comment. As a counter to White's view of intellectual coherence,
however, Watson presents an interesting counterpoint by which to test the development
of a rule which was, by the end of the nineteenth century, devoid of coherence.
Also beyond the scope of this Comment is an analysis of the Fellow Servant rule
in the light of the well-known economic efficiency theories development by Richard
Posner and his followers. See, e.g., Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.

29 (1972); Posner, Change in the Common Law: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 189 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Posner, Change in the Common Law].
Posner views nineteenth-century judges as following the "invisible hand" of economic
efficiency whether consciously or not. They thereby created a tort law which maximized the efficient allocation of resources in an industrializing society. Posner's view
focuses heavily on a retrospective analysis of rules like the Fellow Servant rule. See
generally Posner, Change in the Common Law, supra. This Comment, however, focuses not on the economic effects of the rule, but rather upon the process by which it
was created. Posner's analysis is not, therefore, particularly relevant to the questions
posed here.
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This Comment examines the sufficiency of these views to account
for the development of the Fellow Servant rule. It traces the migration
of the rule through various jurisdictions through a study of cases of first
impression. Such cases are excellent vehicles for examining the migration of any doctrine, for in adopting or rejecting any particular rule,
judges feel a particular burden of explanation. 7
Part I of the Comment discusses the English and American cases
that established the Fellow Servant rule. This section suggests that
these cases were followed by subsequent courts at least in part because
of intellectual forces within the legal community. The Comment argues
that among the intellectual forces shaping the rule was the continuing
eighteenth-century myth that the role of judges was to "discover"
rather than to make the rules of the common law. Once correctly discovered, these judges believed, such rules must be strictly adhered to by
subsequent courts."i
Part II examines those jurisdictions that resisted the Fellow Servant rule by creating exceptions to it. It suggests that common law
judges chose to resist the rule by creating exceptions to it rather than by
rejecting it outright, and that their choice was shaped primarily by contemporary legal norms.
The Comment concludes that no explanation of the development
of the Fellow Servant rule can be complete without acknowledging the
role played by economic developments. The rule developed in an industrial context, and Fellow Servant problems came before the courts because the machines of a rapidly industrializing society were maiming
ever-growing numbers of employees. 19 Moreover, the response of judges
like Shaw, when faced with Fellow Servant cases, was undoubtedly influenced by the consequences that they recognized their decision would
have for the economic and social developments they wished to foster.2 °
Such an explanation, however, while necessary, is not sufficient to
explain the development of the Fellow Servant rule as it traveled
through the American jurisdictions. By the late nineteenth century, the
rule varied from state to state; its hallmark was not consistent subsidization of economic growth, but rather incoherence and inconsistency.2"
17 See, e.g., Coon v. Syracuse & U.R.R., 6 Barb. 231, 236 (1849), affd, 5 N.Y.
492 (1851).
lB See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
19 See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 5, at 60.
20 See L. LEvY, supra note 15, at 178-79; C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE

AMERICAN BAR

486 (1911).

The Fellow Servant rule, in many jurisdictions, had developed into such a maze
of conflicting rules, exceptions, and qualifications that no lawyer could confidently advise a client as to the exact state of his liability. See infra notes 148-224 and accompa2
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These developments, the Comment concludes, cannot be explained as a
judicial response to economic needs within society at large, but were
dependent far more on intellectual imperatives within the legal community. Many of Shaw's colleagues on the early nineteenth-century bench
were not instrumentalists. Because they framed their responses to the
rule within the constraints imposed by prevailing legal norms and techniques, they developed rules for their jurisdictions that produced shortterm legal harmony at the expense of long-term legal coherence.
I.
A.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE

Priestley v. Fowler, and its Influence upon American Courts

It is not strange that economic determinists detected a conspiracy
to aid the industrial classes in the Fellow Servant rule because the law
out of which the rule developed had definitively imposed liability on a
master for the consequences of a servant's negligence. In the eighteenth
century, the rule of respondeat superior was extremely broad and
firmly entrenched. As one of the earliest compilations of American law
restated the rule: "the master is responsible for the acts of his servant, if
done by his command, expressly or impliedly given." 2 2 There were few
exceptions to the rule, noted one treatise writer, for the law imposed
upon the master the absolute duty to "employ servants who [were] skilful and careful."2 "
This broad principle could have covered the situation in which an
employee negligently inflicted an injury, not upon a stranger, but upon
a fellow employee.24 In France the high court of appeal did rule that
respondeat superior was the principle applicable to Fellow Servant sitDying text. Treatise writers worried about the "extraordinary diversity of judicial opinion . . . without a parallel in any department of jurisprudence." 4 C. LABATT,
MASTER AND SERVANT 4143 (2d ed. 1913). Another noted, "He must be a bold man
who would undertake to tell where the doctrine of common employment [the Fellow
Servant rule] ends, and that of the master's duty ... begins in any State in the Union."
Shirley, The Future of Our Profession, 17 AM. L. REV. 645, 662 (1883). The litigation

on the subject was enormous and the economic benefit of the rule to any class in society, except possibly the lawyers, was doubtful. In a widely used digest at the turn of the
century, for example, the cases on a master's liability for injuries caused by negligent
fellow servants consumed 750 pages. See 34 AM. DIG. 839-1588 (Century ed. 1902).
22 2 N. DANE, GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 494
(1823); see also T. REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME, OF PARENT AND
CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, MASTER AND SERVANT AND OF THE POWERS OF

COURTS OF CHANCERY 357-58 (2d ed. 1846); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF AGENCY § 452 (1839). The rule, in fact, was a prime example of liability
arising out of predetermined status relationships, or contract, which was a characteristic
of 18th century law. Cf. M. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 207-08.
23 T. REEVE, supra note 22, at 358.
24 See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 5, at 52-53.
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and the United States Supreme Court came close to the same

result in Philadelphia& Reading Railroad v. Derby.26
The plaintiff in Derby was a stockholder of the defendant railroad
company who was injured by the negligent conduct of the train engineer while riding on an official company tour. One argument advanced
by the defendants was that the master is not liable for injury inflicted
negligently by one servant upon another.27 The Court stated, however,
that the cases cited by defendants "[have] no application to the present."'28 "[T]he maxim of 'respondeat superior,' which, by legal imputation, makes the master liable for the acts of his servant, is wholly
irrespective of any contract, express or implied, or any other relation
'2 9
between the injured party and the master."
Nevertheless, by the end of the eighteenth century, Eiglish and
American courts had begun to set some limits to a master's liability for
his servant's negligence, especially in those situations where the master
actually exercised little control over the servant's behavior. He would
not be held liable, for example, for a servant's willful, as opposed to
negligent, wrong. 0 Similarly, there were limits placed upon the extent
of a shipowner's liability for the captain's negligence. Both limitations
had as their rationale the protection of the master/servant relationship.
'5 The respondeat provision of the French Civil Code is the broadly phrased Article 1384. CODE CIVIL ART. 1384. The Cour de cassation, the high court of appeal, held
in 1841 that respondeat definitely covered negligent injuries inflicted by one servant
upon another, and rejected all argument that the master's liability under the law could
be mitigated by a servant's "assumption of risk" implied in his rate of wages. See
Reygasse v. Plazon, June 28, 1841, Cour de cassation, 1841 Recueil Periodique et
Critique [D.P.] I 273. It is interesting to note that the case arose out of a domestic
situation similar to that in Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1937). In Reygasse
the injury occurred when two gardeners were trimming a hedge. See infra notes 33-49
and accompanying text.
2 55 U.S. 467, 14 How. 468 (1852).
217Id. at 484. For this proposition the defendants cited Farwell v. Boston &
W.R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). Id.
28 55 U.S. at 484, 14 How. at 484.
29 55 U.S. at 484, 14 How. at 485. In using such broad language the Court did
not, however, state that the particular facts of the case before it presented a Fellow
Servant situation, and thus did not expressly hold that respondeat was the principle
applicable to such situations. The Court did state, however, that respondeatwas applicable to the following situations:
If one be lawfully on the street or highway, and another's servant carelessly drives a stage or carriage against him, and injures his property or
person, it is no answer to an action against the master for such injury,
either, that the plaintiff was riding for pleasure, or that he was a stockholder in the road, or that he had not paid his toll, or that he was the
guest of the defendant, or riding in a carriage borrowed from him, or that
the defendant was the friend, benefactor, or brother of the plaintiff.
55 U.S. at 484-85, 14 How. at 485.
30 See 2 N. DANE, supra note 22, at 494-95.
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The law could not, courts held, "allow to servants a power to ruin their
masters.""1
A similar spirit animated Lord Abinger, sitting in the Court of
Exchequer, when in 1837, he announced the court's decision in
Priestley v. Fowler," the case which first enunciated the Fellow Servant rule."5 Priestley was an unlikely case to carry its heavy precedential burden. Fowler, a butcher, ordered his assistant Priestley to make
deliveries in an overloaded van driven by another assistant. The van
capsized, fracturing Priestley's leg. He sued his master for damages,
won, and the master appealed."'
Lord Abinger's opinion is scarcely a model of judicial clarity or
authority. 5 He began by making the questionable decision to treat the
case as one of first impression, which he was "therefore to decide..
upon general principles."36
One general principle relied upon by Abinger was assumption of
risk. During the argument at court, Abinger stated that "[t]he plaintiff
was not bound to go by an overloaded van; he consents to take the
risk."3 " In his opinion for the court, he stated that "the plaintiff must
have known as well as his master, and probably better" about the dangerous condition of the van.38 He noted that "[tihe servant is not bound
to risk his safety in the service of his master and may, if he thinks fit,
decline any service in which he reasonably apprehends injury to
81 Id. at 495. The eighteenth-century master/servant relationship was one based
upon status and social ties rather than on economics. See M. GLENDON, THE NEW
FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 146-47 (1981).
3 150 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1032 (1837).
3 See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 5, at 54; Smith, supra note 9, at 259.

But see Ingman, The Rise and Fall of the Doctrine of Common Employment, 1978
REV. 106 (claiming that the doctrine of common employment must be traced
not to Priestley, but to subsequent cases which misread Priestley).
150 Eng. Rep. at 1030-31.
One authority considers much of the reasoning in the case to have been "far
fetched" and cites it as a prime example of an incorrectly decided case. See R. CROSS,

JURID.

PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW

191-92 (2d ed. 1968); see also Ingman supra note 33, at

108-10.
3' 150 Eng. Rep. at 1032. Ingman notes that the case could easily have been
decided by reference to cases on the ill-treatment of apprentices, health and welfare of
servants, or working condition of seamen. See Ingman supra note 33, at 109. The
plaintiff's lawyer, in fact, argued the case strictly in terms of respondeat. See 150 Eng.
Rep. at 1031.
17 150 Eng. Rep. at 1031.
38 Id. at 1033. During argument Abinger had stated that "[i]t does not appear on
the face of the declaration, that the plaintiff knew the van was overloaded, and it cannot be intended after verdict: on the other hand, it does not appear that the defendant
knew it." Id. at 1031. The report of the case, however, notes that the plaintiff had
given evidence at trial that the van had "been overloaded with the defendant's knowledge." Id.
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himself." 9
Abinger also rested his decision upon general principles of public
policy. He stated that a servant had a duty to exercise "diligence and
caution" to protect himself from the negligence of a fellow servant, and
that allowing the plaintiff to recover would discourage the exercise of
that caution.40 He concluded that "diligence and caution . . . are a
much better security against any injury the servant may sustain by the
negligence of others engaged under the same master, than any recourse
against his master for damages could possibly afford." 4
Perhaps the true basis of Lord Abinger's opinion lies in his
"parade of horrors"-the consequences he feared would ensue from
holding the master liable. Should Priestley recover, he warned, "the
principle of that liability will be found to carry us to an alarming extent."4' 2 He predicted,
The master, for example, would be liable to the servant for
the negligence of the chambermaid, for putting him into a
damp bed; for that of the upholsterer, for sending in a crazy
bedstead, whereby he was made to fall down while asleep
and injure himself; for the negligence of the cook, in not
properly cleaning the copper vessels used in the kitchen; of
the butcher, in supplying the family with meat of a quality
injurious to the health; of the builder, for a defect in the
foundation of the house, whereby it fell, and injured both the
master and the servant by the ruins.4 3

Priestley, as Abinger's feared consequences demonstrate, grew out
of a desire to preserve the eighteenth-century master/servant relationship.4 4 It decided no more than that an employee was considered to
have assumed the risks of which he was aware, or that were obvious.
As an English commentator noted, there was no need to extend the case
into the industrial context, nor to read it as creating a broad rule exempting all employers from liability for negligent injuries among coworkers.4 5 Nevertheless, American courts gave Priestley this broad
11 Id. at 1032-33; see also Ingman, supra note 33, at 110 ("Priestley v. Fowler
decided that an employee, on taking employment, is deemed voluntarily to have accepted the risks incidental to the work and of which he is aware or which are
obvious.").
40 150 Eng. Rep. at 1033.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1032.
43 Id.

44 See supra note 31.
45 Ingman, supra note 33, at 110. Smith regards the decision as "appropriate to a

simple pre-industrial society." Smith, supra note 9, at 259. Ingman notes that the ex-
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reading.
Although the industrial contexts of most American cases did not
46
provide good factual analogies to Priestley's master/servant situation,
Priestley was continually cited in America for the broad proposition
that an employer should not be liable for negligent injuries inflicted by
one of his employees upon another.47 Even those judges who struggled
to narrow the rule's application felt compelled to explain at length why
Priestley's rationale did not cover the case before the court, rather than
simply distinguishing the case on its facts, or dismissing it as unauthoritative "foreign" authority. 48 What, then, explains the continuing dis-

position of American courts to acknowledge the authority of this recent
English decision?
One explanation has been given by Friedman and Ladinsky.
Priestley, in their view, remained authoritative simply because its principle of restricting an employer's liability filled a need in an industrializing America: "Had there been no Priestley v. Fowler, it would have
been necessary-and hardly difficult-to invent one." 49
An alternative explanation, which accords better with what courts
did, rather than what they might have done, recognizes the continuing
authority of English precedent in mid-nineteenth-century American
courts. This explanation, however, conflicts with one central proposition of the Horwitz thesis. For Horwitz, the transformation of American law depended upon a rejection by instrumentalist judges of the constraints of English form and authority and an acceptance instead of a
style of judicial reasoning which was "derived from a new conception of
common law as a self-conscious instrument of social policy."5 0 For evitension of the Priestley rule to cover negligence of fellow servants in an industrial context did not come about in England until 1850, in Hutchinson v. York, N. & B. Ry.,
155 Eng. Rep. 150 (1850). See Ingman, supra note 33, at 114. In Hutchinson the rule
was broadly stated (and imputed to Priestley) that a servant "when he engages to serve
a master, undertakes ... to run all the ordinary risks of the service, and this includes
the risk of negligence on the part of a fellow-servant." Hutchinson, 155 Eng. Rep. at
154. This explanation will not account for the authority Priestley had in America, however, where it was cited to support the broad Fellow Servant principle both before and
after 1850. See, e.g., Scudder v. Woodbridge, I Ga. 195, 198 (1846); Coon v. Syracuse
& U.R.R., 6 Barb. 231, 235 (1849), affd, 5 N.Y. 492 (1851); Ponton v. Wilmington &
W.R.R., 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 245, 246 (1858); Ryan v. Cumberland Valley R.R., 23 Pa.
384, 386 (1854).
46 It has been argued that Priestley was also inappropriate to rapidly industrializing mid-nineteenth century Britain. See Smith, supra note 9, at 259.
47 See, e.g., Coon v. Syracuse & U.R.R., 5 N.Y. 492, 494 (1851); Ryan v. Cumberland Valley R.R., 23 Pa. 384, 386 (1854).
48 See, e.g., Gillenwater v. Madison & I.R.R., 5 Ind. 339, 343-44 (1854).
4 Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 5, at 55.
50 M. HORWrrZ, supra note 1, at 25. See id. at 22-26; see also Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth
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dence, Horwitz relied on state statutes forbidding the continued citation
of recent English cases and on statements by American scholars that
much of English common law was "as inapplicable to [American] concerns as the laws of Germany or Spain."5 1
In fact, such evidence may prove only that the fears of those jurists
who wished to free American law from common law constraints were
well grounded. American lawyers, despite the best efforts of these reformers, remained wedded to the English sources of authority that their
training had taught them to revere. 2 As the Philadelphia lawyer
Charles Ingersoll complained, "American lawyers and judges adhere
with professional tenacity to the laws of the Mother Country." "Recent
English adjudications," he noted, were "received with a respect, too
much bordering on submission." He deplored the "professional bigotry" which led to the acceptance of these authorities "without probation or fitness." 53
This continuing hold of English authority is not surprising. The
apprenticeship training of most American lawyers practicing in the
early nineteenth century depended heavily upon an almost ritual reading of English authorities; 54 English opinions were the standard by
which lawyers judged the products of American courts,55 and the professional conduct of the English bench and bar was held up as the
model for the profession.5
The continuing weight given precedents of authoritative English
Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 514 (1974). See generally Scheiber, Instrumentalisn and Property Rights: A Reconsideration of American 'Styles ofJudicialReasoning' in the 19th Century, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 1, 4.
51 1 N. DANE, supra note 22, at v; see M. HoRwrrz, supra 1, at 1-30.
52This was precisely what Scheiber found regarding American riparian law:
"[flar from rejecting common-law precedents out of hand, American judges felt constrained to cast emergent riparian law in the traditional framework." See Scheiber,
supra note 50, at 5. These judges, he notes, "often bent far to adopt outright-or at
least to acknowledge the basic validity of 'ancient English ... authorities.'" See id.
(footnote omitted); see also L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 285.
53 C. INGERSOLL, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE INFLUENCE OF AMERICA ON

MIND (1823), cited in C. WARREN, supra note 20, at 509; see also Shirley, supra
note 21, at 658 ("Our courts constantly turn to the reports of the mother country and
her dependencies."); Law Reform-Practice, 12 MONTHLY L. RE'. (n.s. No. 2) 61, 71
THE

(1849).
" See 2 A. CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 17576, 288 (1965).
55 Cf. e.g., Story, Progress of Jurisprudence, An Address Delivered Before the
Members-of the Suffolk Bar (1821), in

THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH

198, 233 (W. Story ed. 1852) ("[E]xemplifications of our judgments may pass.
. to England; and it ought to be our pride to know, that they will not be disgraced
under the inspection of the sober benchers of any Inn of Court.").
STORY

"See,

e.g., The Bench and Bar in England, 12

217, 223 (1849).

MONTHLY

L. REP. (n.s. No. 2)
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courts had an important influence on the development of the Fellow
Servant rule in America. Beginning with almost the first case, defendants' counsel cited Priestley's holding as persuasive authority for the
proposition that a master was not liable in damages to his servant for
injuries caused by a fellow servant.5" American courts disposed to reject
the Fellow Servant rule could do so only by rejecting or lessening the
force of a decision of the English Court of Exchequer.58
B.

Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Rail Road: Establishing the
Rule in America

The first American cases to adopt the Fellow Servant rule were
Murray v. South Carolina Railroad59 and Farwell v. Boston &
Worcester Rail Road.Y° Both cases involved railroad accidents, which
would come to be the typical Fellow Servant context." Both cases
squarely held that masters would not be held liable for negligent injuries inflicted by one employee upon another. Yet Farwell is regarded by
most authorities as the case which established the Fellow Servant rule
in America.62 Murray, decided four years before Farwell, faded quickly
into relative obscurity. Murray, a divided opinion, weakly reasoned,
from a little-regarded state court, epitomized the type of case authority
57 See, e.g., Scudder v. Woodbridge, 1 Ga. 195, 196 (1846); Farwell v. Boston
&
W.R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 54 (1842).

5 One way to do so was to counter the weight of Priestley with authority from
another common law jurisdiction, Scotland. In Dixon v. Rankin, 1852 Sess. Cas., 14 D.
420, the Scots Court of Sessions decisively rejected the Priestley doctrine. "If this be the
law of England . . . ," held Lord Cockburn, "it most certainly is not the law of Scotland." He was glad of it, he observed, because he had "rarely come upon any principle
that seem[ed] less reconcileable to general legal reason." If servants did assume any
risk, they did so on the master's account, and in justice the master should be liable for
harm. 14 D. at 426.
Dixon was reprinted in America in one of the first specialized unofficial reporters.
See 1 AM. R.R. CASES 569 (1852). The reasoning was cited by American authorities to
counter Priestley'sweight, although the case was not followed. See, e.g., Bassett v. Norwich & W.R.R., 19 MONTHLY L. REP. (n.s. No. 9) 551 (1857); Cleveland, C. &
C.R.R. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 201, 213 (1854).
59 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) 385 (1838).
60 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
61 The Fellow Servant rule was not necessarily limited to railroad accidents. See,
e.g., Albro v. Agawam Canal Co., 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 75, 77 (1850) (Farwell cited as
governing authority for absolving the owner of a cotton mill from liability). Nevertheless, most cases of first impression arose in a railroad context, and the rule itself was
considered, at least by many treatise writers, as a part of railroad law. See I. REDFIELD, A PRACTrCAL TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF RAILWAYS 386-92 (2d ed. 1858);
H. PIERCE, A TREATISE ON AMERICAN RAILROAD LAW 286-310 (1857); see also
Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 5, at 60. Because one can trace the rule's development solely within the railroad context, the wider application of the rule is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
62 See, e.g., C. WARREN, supra note 20, at 485; L. LEVY, supra note 15, at 167.
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nineteenth-century courts, were least disposed to follow. 63 Farwell was
just the opposite.
Farwell64 came before Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in March 1842.65 The facts presented
a sympathetic case for the plaintiff. Farwell was an engineer on the
new Boston & Worcester. While the engineer was driving his engine
with all due care, the train jumped the track because a depot employee
had neglected to throw the appropriate switch. Farwell was "thrown
with great violence upon the ground" and his right hand was crushed
under the passing railroad car. 6
Counsel for both plaintiff and defendants presented a narrow case
to Shaw for decision. Plaintiff's counsel conceded that respondeat did
not cover the case, and that Priestley, which had been "rightly decided," was the relevant precedent. 7 He believed, however, that his
client's case must be distinguished because an engineer and a switch
tender did not share a "common purpose," and therefore could not be
considered to be "fellow servants."6 8 Defendants' counsel, predictably,
6 See infra notes 106-10 & 141-46 and accompanying text. The first American
plaintiff to be confronted by the Fellow Servant rule was James Murray, a former
tailor of "intemperate habits" who had taken work as a fireman on one of South Carolina's first steam railroads. Murray, 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) at 385. When the engineer
negilgently ran the train into a horse, Murray's leg was crushed between the engine
and tender. The factual situation was confused, however, and it was not clear whether
Murray's injury had resulted from a fellow servant's negligence. See id. at 402
(O'Neall, J., dissenting).
The court divided, 7-3. The majority opinion is a model of judicial hesitation and
timidity. The court relied heavily on the fact that there was no precedent for holding an
employer liable. Although the railroad's liability to its passengers as a common carrier
was clear, the court refused to extend liability to the railroad, as employer, "without a
single case or precedent to sustain it." 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) at 400. The court ended
on a tentative note, issuing an invitation to subsequent courts to narrow Murray's holding to the facts of the case. It was "not intended," the court observed, "to prejudge
other questions, which may arise between the company and its servants," nor did it
consider Murray to settle the question in future cases of "whether an individual or
company will be liable for the acts of one agent to another." Id. at 401.
The tentative nature of the majority contrasted sharply with the two strong dissents, which agrued that respondeat fully covered the case. Surely, one dissenting justice observed, no one would "presume" to "contend that the rule applicable to service in
a rail road company, is, that the company is not liable to any agent, for any injury,
provided the company can only shew that another of its agents has inflicted it." Id. at
408 (Johnston, J., dissenting). In fact, within one year of Murray, Chief Justice Shaw
of Massachusetts "presumed" to contend for a rule precisely this broad. Compare the
authoritative nature of Shaw's Farwell opinion, infra text accompanying notes 109-14.
45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
65 On Shaw himself, see the excellent biography by L. LEVY, supra note 15.
66 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 50.
67 Id. at 52.
18 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 51 (plaintiff's argument). One might argue that it was an
inexcusable tactical error for plaintiff's counsel, Loring, to have conceded that respondeat was not applicable. Horwitz, in fact, labeled Loring's concession as "astonishing."
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argued that Murray and Priestley precisely covered the case, but that,
in any event, it would "not be necessary for the court to lay down a
general rule, in order to decide this case for the defendants." 9
The arguments of counsel are particularly interesting because they
demonstrate clearly the narrow way in which Farwell might have been
decided by a judge other than Shaw. They epitomize the model of decision in fact followed in later Fellow Servant cases.70
Shaw, however, viewed the case in a much broader light and selfconsciously laid out and justified a general rule for regulating a
master's liability for negligent injuries inflicted by employees upon
their co-workers. He framed the question for decision in the broadest
possible terms. "The question is," he noted, "whether, for damages sustained by one of [a railroad's employees] by means of the carelessness
and negligence of another, the party injured has a remedy against the
common employer." '
Shaw's Farwell opinion is well known and his reasoning has been
extensively analyzed. 2 He simply brushed away any suggestion that
the case could be decided by extending respondeat, with a grateful nod
to plaintiff's counsel for conceding the point,7 and proceeded to justify
his rule on the intertwined theories of implied contract and assumption
of risk. When a servant voluntarily accepts employment, Shaw concluded, he assumes all risks "incident" to his employment, among
which must be included the risk of "carelessness and negligence of
those who are in the same employment."7 4 Such a rule best ensures
industrial safety, Shaw reasoned, for it gives employees, who are in the
best position to observe and guard against their co-workers' negligence,
75
the incentive to do so.

A striking aspect of Farwell, to a modern observer, is its self-consciousness. Shaw was acutely aware that he was creating law. He
stated his conclusions broadly, and dismissed any attempts to narrow
M. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 210. While the concession made Shaw's opinion easier
to write, Loring was only following a perfectly acceptable model of lawyering, that is,

conceding the general point, and attempting to distinguish his client's case. Such tactics
were in no small measure responsible for the rapid spread of the Fellow Servant rule.

See infra text accompanying notes 217-22.

"9 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 54 (defendant's argument).

70
71

See infra text accompanying notes 120-224.
45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 55.

72 See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 263-64, 414; M. HoRwrrZ, supra
note 1, at 209-10; R. POUND, supra note 13, at 87.
73
74
76

45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 56.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 59; cf. Priestley, 150 Eng. Rep. at 1033 ("To allow this sort of action to

prevail would be an encouragement to the servant to omit that diligence and caution
which he is in duty bound to exercise on the behalf of his master .... ).
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his rule as "supposed distinctions" on which "it would be extremely
difficult to establish a practical rule."' This self-consciousness is apparent in Shaw's cavalier reference to the only precedents which existed, Priestley and Murray.77 In contrast to his elaborate exposition of
his assumption of risk and implied contract theories, Shaw simply observed that the "authorities, as far as they go," supported his position.78
The premises upon which Farwell rested reflected accurately the
precarious reality of the early railroads. While recent scholarship has
cast doubt on the key role of railroads in fueling nineteenth-century
economic growth,7 9 there is little doubt that contemporaries enthusiastically supported the new mode of transportation as a boon to enterprise.
The economic position of the early railroads, however, was uncertain;
railroad supporters worried about the ability of the roads to surmount
the twin obstacles of uncertain financing and a rudimentary technology. 80 A recent study of the early years of the Boston & Worcester
Railroad, the defendant in Farwell, graphically depicts the realities of
the early railroads. The trains ran along a single track, with no signals,
and, initially, no way of warning scheduled passenger trains of the
presence of repair trains on the track."1 The directors attempted to
minimize the danger through a system of rigid scheduling and elaborate
safety rules, the necessity to obey which was pressed upon the employees.8 ' The wages paid employees charged with the responsibility of enforcing these rules were considerably higher than those paid to lower
level employees. 8
The entrepreneurs who owned the railroads, then, were interested
in reducing safety hazards as well as in turning a profit." Shaw responded well to their concerns when in Farwell he relieved the rail45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 60.
Although he referred to Priestley in a slighting manner, Shaw nonetheless
rested his decision on the same assumption of risk argument used by Lord Abinger. See
supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
78 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 57.
79 See, e.g., R. FOoEL, RAILROADS AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH: EsSAYS IN ECONOMETRIC HISTORY 15 (1964).
80 See, e.g., S. SALSBURY, THE STATE, THE INVESTOR, AND THE RAILROAD:
THE BOSTON & ALBANY, 1825-1867, at 81-82 (1967).
71
7

81

"Miraculously, however, no scheduled train ever collided with another during

the early years. The railroad's wrecks all involved an unscheduled repair train, which
emerged as the system's Jonah." Id. at 115.
82 Id. at 113-19. See generally A. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE:
CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 21-23, 38 (1962).
83 See S. SALSBURY, supra note 80, at 359 n.7. Conductors, who ran the trains,
received $600 yearly; engineers, who drove them, received $2 per day; and firemen and
brakemen received $1 respectively.
8'The Boston & Worcester's board of directors had created a rate structure which
they had originally hoped would produce a six per cent annual dividend. Id. at 123.
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roads of potentially massive liability for Fellow Servant injuries and
thereby placed the burden of avoiding accidents on the employees who
were already paid to prevent them.
Shaw, then, by attending so well to the needs of the entrepreneurial classes,8 5 is the very model of Horwitz's instrumentalist
judge. Because many of his contemporaries on the American bench and
bar were motivated by far different imperatives, however, they simply
followed Farwell as precedent, rather than emulating Shaw's style and
examining his premises.
C.

Following Farwell: Jurisprudence by Discovery

With the spectacular growth of railroads in the 1840's88 came the
predictable rash of railroad accidents. One American jurisdiction after
another faced the question whether to adopt the Fellow Servant rule.
Many recognized that it was "a question of very great importance,
from the frequency with which accidents of that kind are liable to happen upon the numerous railroads of the state." 7 Most courts decided to
follow Priestley and Farwell and broadly adopt the rule.
New York was typical. A lower court had declined an opportunity
to adopt the rule in 18448 and the question did not reach an appellate
court until 1849 in Coon v. Syracuse & Utica Rail-Road. 9 The plain85 C. WARREN, supra note 20, at 449. Warren observed that Shaw had been
"largely influenced by economic conditions and the need of favoring the young and
struggling institution of railroads."
There is an intriguing question of just how personally Shaw was acquainted with
the Boston & Worcester. In his papers is a letter dated February 28, 1842 from George
Bliss, founder, director, and newly elected president of the railroad. Bliss invited Shaw
and "other members of the Supreme Court" to accompany the company's directors and
executive officers on "an excursion to Springfield on Friday the 4th ... to meet the
public authorities of N. York including their Judiciary." With the letter is a ticket,
made out "For Chief Justice Shaw" for a return fare, Boston to Albany, on March 4,
1842. There is no indication whether Shaw made the trip. Farwell was decided at the
March .1842 term. See Letter from George Bliss to Lemuel Shaw (Feb. 28, 1842)
(Lemuel Shaw Papers, Reel XII, No. 762, Univ. of Va. Library). On Bliss, see S.
SALSBURY, supra note 80 at 182.
"a Between 1830 and 1848, there was a total of 5,205 miles of track built in the
United States. Between 1849 and 1860, 30,135 miles were built. See C. WARREN,
supra note 20, at 479.
8 Coon v. Syracuse & U.R.R., 6 Barb. 231, 236 (1849), affd, 5 N.Y. 492
(1851).
" In Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Hill 592, 594-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844), the court
referred to the "recently adjudged" Farwell decision which, though "thoroughly examined and considered" and of which the court entertained "no doubt of [the] correctness," was not necessary to a decision of the instant case, which was decided on a
theory of contributory negligence.
89 6 Barb. 231 (1849). Coon, decided in an appellate division of the Supreme
Court (New York's lower court) will be considered the case of first impression in New
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tiff, a track repairman operating a hand car, was "run over" by a repair train.90 While the case presented questions of contributory negligence,91 the court ignored them and rested its opinion squarely on
Priestley and Farwell, in which "the subject . . .would seem to be
exhausted." "[I]t would be presumption in me," Judge Pratt wrote, "to
attempt to add anything to the force of those decisions, by way of argument or illustration." 2 His opinion closely followed Shaw's implied
contract theory, and adverted to Lord Abinger's examples in discussing
the policy consequences of a contrary rule. 93 Coon is striking, and typical, in the unqualified manner in which it adopts the Fellow Servant
rule. On the authority of Farwell, Pratt simply dismissed any possible
limitations on the rule.94 The New York Fellow Servant rule, therefore, came close to exempting employers from all liability for industrial
accidents caused by an employee's negligence.
Other jurisdictions emulated the New York approach; some opinions did no more than observe that the question was a new one in the
state, that "the whole argument upon the question is embodied in the
opinion of Chief Justice Shaw," and that therefore the rule must be
York. The presiding judge, Pratt, treated it as such, and was explicit about his reasons
for adopting the broad Fellow Servant rule. Pratt was strongly reaffirmed by the New
York Court of Appeals, in a two-page opinion, in which two justices, Gardiner and
Foot, held that the lower court had rightly followed Farwell. See 5 N.Y. 492, 495
(1851) (Gardiner, J.) ("The case before us cannot be distinguished from that in Metcalf. To the elaborate opinion of chief justice SHAW, nothing can be added without
danter of impairing the force of his reasoning."). The separate opinion of Justice Foot
was even blunter:
Was [sic] this principle sought to be applied for the first time in the present action, I should deem it my duty, not only to examine it in all its
bearings, test its soundness by all the means at my command, and endeavor to reach a correct conclusion, but also to assign in full my reasons.
This duty has, however, been already performed, ably and learnedly, by
three eminent judicial tribunals: viz, the court of exchequer in England
[Priestley], the court of appeals of South Carolina [Murray], and the supreme court of Massachusetts [Farwell] [citations omitted]. They all concur in sanctioning the principle, and I fully acquiesce in their judgment..
. . It must now be considered as settled, and hereafter to form a part of the
common law of the country.
Id. at 496. So, in fact, it was treated in the next Fellow Servant case to reach the Court
of Appeals. See Keegan v. Western R.R., 8 N.Y. 175, 180 (1853).
,o 6 Barb. at 231.
' Counsel for the defendants argued that plaintiff had a "duty to carry a light, so
that . . .he might be seen by the engineers." Id. at 235. The court agreed: "The
evidence ... shows quite clearly that the plaintiff was himself guilty of negligence
."Id.
92 Id. at 236.
93 Id. at 239-40.
" Id. at 241, 242-43. Thus, for example, Pratt turned aside arguments which
would have created exceptions in the case of negligent superiors or workers in different
departments. On these exceptions, see infra text accompanying notes 148-204.
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adopted. 5 As more jurisdictions followed this pattern, the string citations following the adoption of the rule became longer.96
Some scholars have simply correlated the adoption of the broad
rule in so many jurisdictions with the contemporaneous rapid expansion of railroads.97 The two phenomena undoubtedly coincided.9" It is
also true that railroad accidents provided the factual context for most
99
Fellow Servant cases.
Any such explanation, however, standing alone, is insufficient.
Some jurisdictions that followed the rule were highly developed railroad states, but others were not. Moreover, some jurisdictions that
struggled against the rule had a heavy concentration of railroads."'
While it would be wrong to ignore the role played by railroads in providing both the occasion, and, in some instances, the impetus for judges
to adopt the Fellow Servant rule, such an explanation cannot explain
the differences in the rule adopted by jurisdictions exhibiting a generally similar pattern of railroad development.
A plausible explanation for these results is that vastly divergent
legal styles coexisted in the nineteenth century and created the mass of
" Honner v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 15 Ill. 550, 552 (1854). Honner is an extreme
example, a two-page opinion, half of which is taken up by a recitation of the facts. See
also Ryan v. Cumberland Valley R.R., 23 Pa. 384 (1854).
Though this proposition has never been decided upon by this Court, it has
often been considered elsewhere and decided in the negative .

. .

. Where

we find a road is so well beaten, it is easy to follow it, and its beaten
character is an indication that we may follow it with safety.
Id. at 386.
See, e.g., Carle v. Bangor & P. Canal & R.R., 43 Me. 269, 270 (1857);
O'Connell v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 20 Md. 212, 221 (1863). The Maryland restatement is typical in its sweep: "When several persons are employed in the same general
service, and one is injured by the carelessness of another ... the employer is not responsible. The liability to injury of one from the carelessness of his fellows, is but an
ordinary risk against which the law furnished no protection ......
Id.
9 Cf., e.g., C. WARREN, supra note 20, at 485-87.
98 The first great era of railroad expansion was 1840 to 1860. See supra note 86.
Almost all American cases of first impression occurred within this time frame.
" For variations, however, see Walker v. Bolling, 22 Ala. 294 (1853) (steamboat
accident); Randolph v. Hill, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 383 (1836) (mining accident).
10 For details of the narrow version adopted in two states, see infra notes 148204 and accompanying text. An 1873 compilation of railroad trackage and the number
of incorporated railroad companies reveals few differences in development between
those states which adopted the broad Farwell rule and those adopting a qualified version. For example, Illinois, which adopted the broad rule, had 47 companies and 6,620
miles of track; Ohio, which severly qualified the rule, had 42 companies and 4,050
miles of track. Similarly, Maryland, a broad-rule state, had 17 companies and 802
miles; Tennessee, a narrow-rule state, had 18 companies and 1,541 miles. Moreover, if
one compares the incorporation dates of railroad companies in Ohio with those in Massachusetts, one notes that Ohio courts were adopting the narrow rule at the same time
the legislatures in both states were furiously incorporating railroads. AMERICAN RAILROAD MANUAL

460, 410, 280, 378 (E. Vernon ed. 1873).
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conflicting jurisprudence that was the Fellow Servant rule. That is,
some judges may have been disposed to follow Priestley and Farwell
not because they were instrumentalists attuned to economic developments within their jurisdictions as Horwitz would suggest, but rather
because their training and intellectual bias required them to adhere to
certain common law myths. This explanation requires recognition that
instrumentalist judges like Shaw coexisted with judges like Pratt whose
model of proper judicial behavior included adherence to these myths.101
According to these myths, the common law grew, slowly1 02 or
quickly,10 3 out of the customs and practices of any particular society.
The role of judges, in any particular case, was to "discover" what that
04 To any particular legal question, the comrule or custom might be.Y
mon law posited but one correct answer, and those judges who rightly
"discovered" the correct rule were entitled to respect and adherence.' 0 5
These myths put a premium on judicial harmony and consistency
across jurisdictions. A corollary of the concern for harmony was a rev101 Such an explanation also accounts for the peculier way in which judges framed
their dissension to the rule, not by rejecting it, but rather by carving out wide "exceptions" which, in some cases, came close to swallowing the general rule. See infra text
accompanying notes 120-224. A similar explanation is offered by H.N. Scheiber, who
views instrumentalism and traditionalism as coexisting, not only within the same legal
system, but within the same judges. See Scheiber, supra note 50, at 7.
'0' J. WILSON, LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE OF PHILADELPHIA (1791) in 1
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 335, 353 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967); see also 1 J. KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 471 (12th ed. 1884) ("[a] great proportion" of
the rules and maxims "grew into use by gradual adoption, and received, from time to
time, the sanction of the courts of justice").
20 J.WILSON, supra note 102, at 354; see also C. WARREN, supra note 20, at
447.
o10
The maxim was stated by Blackstone: "the decisions of courts of justice are the
evidence of what is common law." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 88-89, quoted
in R. CROSS, supra note 35, at 23. This myth of judges as "discoverers" of the common
law persisted far into the nineteenth century. A late nineteenth century law dictionary,
in its definition of "common law," observed, "[t]he decision of a court which establishes
or declares a rule of law may be reduced to writing and published in the reports; but
this report is not the law; it is but evidence of the law." 1 J. BOUVIER, LAW DiCTIONARY 304 (14th ed. 1875). For an assertion that conceptions of common law as "discovered" and "made" by judges have always coexisted, see Simpson, The Common Law
and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 77, 81 (2d ser. 1973). For
the persistence of the "discovery" myth, see F. LAWSON, THE RATIONAL STRENGTH
OF ENGLISH LAW 16-17 (1951).
105 A review of a popular railroad treatise, I. REDFIELD, supra note 61, observed
that the emerging principles of railroad law were undoubtedly correct and "entitled to
confidence" and "respect" owing to the "general uniformity which prevails in the decisions of these cases as they have arisen from time to time in the courts of some thirty
different and independent States." Notices of New Publications,20 MONTHLY L. REP.
(n.s. No. 10) 533 (1858), cited in C. WARREN, supra note 20, at 492 n.1. Compare I.
REDFIELD, supra note 61, at 389, where he notes the divergence between the Scots and
English opinions on the Fellow Servant rule and observes, "it is always to be regretted,
that any difference of decision should exist, among the tribunals of the different states."
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erence for unanimous opinions and a suspicion that divided courts had
probably "discovered" wrongly."l 6
Horwitz has argued, however, that the old common law myths of
judicial discovery and resultant harmony were discarded by nineteenthcentury judges as unwarranted constraints upon their ability to make
new law. 107 The Fellow Servant cases, however, including those in
which the Farwell rule was broadly adopted, demonstrate that these
myths did not disappear completely in the nineteenth century. 0 8
Shaw's opinion in Farwell contained all the characteristics to indicate that its legal solutions were rightly discovered, and thus could be
unquestioningly followed by subsequent courts. First, the opinions of
certain judges carried more weight than others, and Shaw individually
was preeminet' 0 9 Moreover, as Chief Justice of the highest court of
See, e.g., 1 N. DANE, supra note 22, at vii (he had relied on only the best
authorities, and therefore "not much reliance had been had ... on divided opinions");
The Citing of Authorities, 8 AM. JURIST 111, 117 (1832) ("[c]ases. . . upon which the
court has divided, are to be little relied on as authorities, and sparingly cited").
11 M. HoRwITz, supra note 1, at 1-30. Horwitz characterizes the common law
myths described here as eighteenth-century conceptions, which were discarded by nineteenth-century judges who had "a new conception of common law as a self-conscious
instrument of social policy." These judges believed the common law was not "rules or
doctrines to be discovered, not ... customary norms to be applied through precedent"
but rather "a body of prudential regulations framed ... from the perspective of 'enlarged and liberal views of policy.'" Id. at 25-26. Horwitz' periodization, however, has
been criticized. See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 10. It is a thesis of this Comment that
the older conception of the common law survived into the nineteenth century, and that
it was the interaction of the old and new styles of judicial reasoning which produced the
Fellow Servant rule.
"' These cases are also evidence of the fervent desire of courts to buttress their
opinions by reference to some form of authority. Horwitz has posited that early nineteenth-century judges felt entirely comfortable in reasoning from "first principles," and
discarding inappropriate precedent. See M. HoRwITz, supra note 1, at 24-26. The
Fellow Servant cases offer evidence of precisely the opposite desire, not to contradict
"well-settled" law. In only two cases was there any hint that a court felt free to contradict established authority. See infra text accompanying notes 157-64 & 209-12. Much
more typical was the attitude displayed by the editors of the American Jurist,one of the
earliest legal periodicals, who reviewed new volumes of the Ohio Reports by citing
approvingly the maxim "optima est lex, quae minimum relinquit arbitriojudicis, optimusjudex, qui minimum sibi" ["that law is best which leaves least to the discretion of
the judge; that judge is best who leaves least to his own"]. 7 AM JURIST 261 (1832).
109 Contemporaries self-consciously ordered authorities by referring to the source.
Thus, Professor Greenleaf cautioned entering Harvard students in 1838 that one of the
prime factors to consider in weighing authorities was "the position of the judges." Notes
of Prof Greenleafs Introductory Lecture, 1 LAW. REP. 217, 219 (1838) (hereinafter
cited as Greenleaj). This, of course, remains true in the twentieth century. See R.
POUND, supra note 13, at 86; Clark & Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 260 (1961).
Shaw was on most contemporary, as well as modem, lists of "great judges." See C.
WARREN, supra note 20, at 448; see also 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 54, at 284. One
modem authority noted that Shaw "dominated the common law... of that era." Ursin, supra note 9, at 259.
10'
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Massachusetts, he spoke from a forum which, like the Court of Exchequer, commanded particular respect.1 10
Shaw's method of reasoning, furthermore, reinforced his authority.
He had very carefully considered the nature of authoritative legal argument,' and his Farwell opinion demonstrated his method. He clearly
stated the theories of implied contract and assumption of risk upon
which the opinion rested, considered the policy consequences of an alternative decision, drew proper analogies to existing law, and stated a
broad and clear general rule for exempting a master from liability.,,
This style of analysis carried great persuasive force, if not binding authority. Because the efficient new legal information system put this case
quickly into the hands of railroad lawyers,"' subsequent judges would
have been required to go to elaborate lengths to refute it. It was much
easier to rule that Farwell "appear[ed] to have been thoroughly examined and considered," and therefore one need "entertain no doubt of
4
its correctness."11
Finally, as the years passed, and the number of decisions following
Farwell began to mount, judges disposed to hold masters liable for negligent injuries committed by one servant upon another began to be overwhelmed by the sheer number of precedents against such liability. Railroad lawyers were quick to argue that the Fellow Servant rule was
"well settled law."11 5 As early as 1853, a Pennsylvania lower court
ruled that, even in the absence of a state supreme court decision, a
master's liability could "scarcely be regarded as an open question; for
11 See 1 N. DANE, supra note 22, at vi; R. POUND, supra note 13, at 89 (noting
that Massachusetts opinions were "followed as a matter of course"); see also L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 284.
"' See Shaw, Profession of the Law in the United States, 7 AM. JURIST 56, 69
(1832) (address before the Suffolk Bar, May 1827). On Shaw's opinion style, see L.
LEvY, supra note 15, at 22-26.
11 Shaw's style in fact paralleled that recently described by Cross as the model of
persuasive reasoning in cases of first impression. See R. CROss supra note 35, at 194-

95.

113See infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
114 Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Hill 592, 594-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844) (Beardsley, J.);

see Harrison v. Central R.R., 31 N.J.L. 293, 296 (1865) (Shaw's "argument of great
force and clearness"); see also Honner v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 15 Ill. 550, 551 (1854)
("the whole argument upon the question is embodied in the opinion of Chief Justice
Shaw"); I. REDFIELD, supra note 61, at 426 n.9 ("very lucid and convincing argument
of Shaw Ch. J."). Following a well-considered opinion was considered a perfectly respectable course. Thus, one of the factors Professor Greenleaf cited to Harvard students
in weighing authority was "the degree of consideration which the point may appear to
have received." Greenleaf,supra note 109, at 22.
"' See, e.g., Little Miami R.R. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 415, 422 (1851) (railroad's
argument) ("It is well settled that the master is not liable for injuries sustained by one
workman or servant by the careless or negligent or unskillful act of another workman
or servant.") (emphasis in original).
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other Courts, of the highest respectability . . . have considered and decided it."11 By 1861, courts spoke of the rule as one supported by an
"unbroken current of judicial opinion,' 117 upon which any tribunal,
even in a case of first impression, could rely, thus "greatly relieving us
from the responsibility of settling the law." ' Within twenty-five years
of Priestley, therefore, even those judges disposed to question the correctness of the rule, clearly had to swim against a strong judicial tide to
avoid adopting it. "[W]hatever view we may entertain as to the soundness of the reasons on which the rule was originally established," a
Vermont judge observed in 1860, "it is now so firmly supported by
authority that it would not be wise to overturn it." '1 9
II.

THE "EXCEPTIONS"

TO THE FELLOW SERVANT RULE

The broad Fellow Servant doctrine was not universally accepted.
While those jurisdictions that followed the rule recognized that the
principle was a "comprehensive doctrine, and applies to all agents engaged in the business of the principal," 20 several jursidictions so severely qualified the rule that its effect in exempting an employer from
liability was virtually nullified. The technique by which they did so
was to create exceptions which came close to swallowing the rule.
These "exceptions," which came in a variety of forms, gave the late
nineteenth-century rule its characteristic incoherence which contrasted
so sharply with the clarity of Shaw's rule. No account of the development of the rule, therefore, would be complete without an examination
of the "exceptions."
Those scholars who explain the rule as a response to economic
needs have a ready corollary to explain the growth of the exceptions.
The Fellow Servant rule served its purpose of subsidizing the growth of
railroads during the great years of railroad expansion prior to 1860. By
"the end of the century," Friedman and Ladinsky observe, "the fellowservant rule had lost much of its reason for existence: it was no longer
an efficient cost-allocating doctrine," and therefore the rule was progressively weakened by the development of exceptions.2 1
Mitchell v. Pennsylvania R.R, I AM. L. REG. 717, 718 (1853).
Moseley v. Chamberlain, 18 Wis. 700, 705 (1861).
O'Connell v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 20 Md. 212, 219 (1863).
"9 Hard v. Vermont & Can. R.R., 32 Vt. 473, 478 (1860).
120 Little Miami R.R. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 415, 447 (1851) (Spalding, J.,
dissenting).
11 Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 5, at 62, 59. As F. Pollock described the
process, "[tlhere are some authorities which are followed and developed in the spirit,
which become the starting-point of new chapters of the law; there are others that are
followed only in the letter, and become slowly but surely choked and crippled by excep11

"
1..
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Yet such an explanation does not account for the process by which
the exceptions in fact developed. The most important exceptions, and
their justifications, developed contemporaneously with the broad rule
itself. They were an alternative to Shaw's Fellow Servant rule, rather
than an outgrowth of it. The most important exceptions developed in
early cases of first impression, when several courts rejected the Priestley
v. Fowler122 and Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Rail Road1 2' rationales and held employers liable. These courts created "exceptions"
which happened to coincide exactly with the facts of the cases before
them.
Several questions are raised by the use of this technique. If the
rationale for accepting the rule was to foster the growth of nascent railroads, why was the "acceptance" of the rule so grudging and qualified?
On the other hand, if the judicial aim was to reject the rule, why was
this not done outright? To address these questions, this Comment examines the development of the most important exceptions to the rule, in
treatises and in the cases from several jurisdictions. It concludes that
"exceptions" were an acceptable way of expressing dissent while preserving a veneer of judicial consistency. It notes, however, that the long
range consequence of decision by "exception" was a rule of tort law
that was as confused as it was cruel.
A.

The Treatises: Roots of the Exceptions

The theoretical roots of one of the most important exceptions, that
which imposed liability upon a master when the negligent servant
worked in a "different department" from the victim, may be traced to
1844, only two years after the Farwell opinion. In that year, Joseph
Story published the second edition of his Commentaries on the Law of
1 24
Agency.
The first edition was published in 1839, two years after Priestley.
Section 452 contained Story's restatement of the principle of respondeat. Relying on established master/servant law,1 25 Story affirmed the
principle of respondeat and followed his discussion with copious illustrations indicating the extent of the doctrine's reach. 2
tions." F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF FRAUD MISREPRESENTATION AND MISTAKE IN
BRITISH INDIA 53-54 (1894), cited in R. POUND, supra note 13, at 135 (emphasis
added).
122 50 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837).
123 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
124 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1844) [hereinafter cited as STORY II].
125 See supra text accompanying notes 22-31.
128 J.STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 452-453 (1839)
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When Story's second "revised, corrected, and enlarged" edition
was printed in 1844, he added a large subsection, 453(d), to consider
the question whether respondeat applied "to cases of different agents,
employed by the same principal, where one, by his misfeasance, or negligence ... does an injury to the other. ' 127 He noted that the issue had
recently "become a subject of judicial examination," and his discussion
of Priestley and Farwell indicates that he doubted the correctness of
their new rule. 128 The way in which he framed his discussion certainly
had the effect of narrowing the rule's scope. He began by dividing into
two classes the situations to which the rule might be applied: the first,
in which fellow servants were employed "in the same business or employments," and the second, in which they were engaged in different
departments. Story treated both Priestley and Farwell as applying to
the first category only. Neither case, he believed, covered the situation
where a common employer engaged two agents in different parts of his
business. In such a situation, Shaw's rationale of providing incentives
for employees to watch for the negligence of their colleagues could not
apply; therefore, the expansive respondeat principle would still cover
the case.12 9 In Farwell, however, Shaw had considered and rejected any
such idea that his general rule was inapplicable to employees working
in "different departments."' 130
Story's categorization and confinement of the Fellow Servant rule
exemplifies the role played by nineteenth-century legal treatise writers.
Story, former Supreme Court Justice and first Dane Professor at
Harvard, was undoubtedly the leading treatise writer of his era. 3 ' He
shared a conception of his function, however, with less exalted colleagues. Their job was to harmonize and systematize conflicting decisions on increasingly technical legal subjects. This role led them, as it
[hereinafter cited as STORY I]. Story criticized a much-quoted section of Blackstone on
respondeat as being too restrictive of the maxim. Id. § 453, at 466 n.2.
127 STORY

II, supra note 124, § 453(d).

In discussing Priestley, Story clearly distanced himself from Abinger's description of the consequences of a contrary decision: "Any other doctrine (it is said) would
lead to mischievous consequences." STORY II, supra note 105, § .453(d), at 565. He
characterized Shaw's Farwell opinion as "elaborate" rather than "sound" or "wellreasoned." Id. § 453(e), at 567 n.1.
129 Id. § 453(d)-(f). He proceeded to give a number of examples of the "intrinsic
difficulties and inconveniences in pressing the doctrine ... to such a large extent." Id.
128

§ 453(0, at 571. One of his hypothetical examples involved a carpenter, employed to
build a house for a coach-owner, who was injured while travelling in the coach toward

his workplace. Id. A very similar factual situation faced the Indiana Supreme Court in
Gillenwater v. Madison & I.R.R., 5 Ind. 339 (1854). See infra text accompanying
notes 191-200.
"20 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 60.
131 L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 288-89.
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did Story, to go beyond the decided cases and to "caution" or "on
proper occasions, by remarks, notes and comments, to examine and explain ... and sometimes to show the law is not, as it has been in some
decisions stated to be." ' 2
Story's treatment of the Fellow Servant rule set the pattern for
subsequent and more specialized treatises, such as Redfield and Pierce
on railways, and Angell on common carriers. 3 In place of Shaw's
broad rule, they (like Story) presented a more limited rule followed by
a growing number of "exceptions," or situations in which, for one reason or another, the rule did not apply."3
These writers wielded considerable authority. In theory, of course,
even the best treatises were not supposed to have "the character of an
authority, which can properly belong only to adjudged cases. ' ' 135 In
practice, however, lawyers depended heavily upon them. They figured
prominently in arguments of counsel in Fellow Servant cases.1 6 In several jurisdictions, in fact, the rule and its limitation were adopted
largely on the authority of Story, Redfield, or Angell. 13 7 The doubts
and qualifications of the treatise writers, however, created weighty authority on the other side. If the treatises very early put a qualified
stamp of approval on the "general rule," they also approved and legitimized the idea that the "rule" must be subject to many "exceptions." ' 3
132

1 N. DANE supra note 22, at vii, iv. See, e.g., J. ANGELL, A

TREATISE ON

THE LAW OF CARRIERS OF GOODS AND PASSENGERS BY LAND AND BY WATER V

(1849):
The objection of the author has been to consider the law on the subject
proposed as it now is, and at the same time to point out such discrepancies
as he has discovered to have occurred, in the course of the gradual adaptation, by judicial tribunals, of leading principles to the vastly multiplied
exigencies of commerce and of society.
The function that treatise writers were performing in the early nineteenth century is
that which White ascribed to later legal scholars; that is, they "extracted principles
from a variety of judicial opinions. Once extracted, these principles were articulated as
working guides to an area of law." G. WHITE, supra note 1, at 39.
133 L REDFIELD, supra note 61; E. PIERCE, supra note 61; J. ANGELL, supra note
132.
134 Pierce, by 1857, stated the general rule in 8 pages, and the exceptions in 15.
E. PIERCE, supra note 61, at 286-310.
13I

Chittenden, Preface to T.

REEVE,

supra note 22, at iii.

See, e.g., Little Miami R.R. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 415, 422-23 (1851) (defendant in error's argument); see also Walter v. Bolling, 22 Ala. 294, 297 (1853) (defendant
in error's argument); Scudder v. Woodbridge, 1 Ga. 195 (1846) (defendant in error's
argument).
137 See, e.g., Scudder v. Woodbridge, 1 Ga. 195, 198 (1846) (the general rule
"may be correct" as it is "distinctly laid down in Story on Agency"); Haynes v. East
Tenn. & Ga. R.R., 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 222, 224 (1866) (citing I. REDFIELD, supra
note 61).
136

13"

See, e.g., I. REDFIELD, supra note 61, at 426 n.9. After citing at length to the

Scots authorities, which heavily criticized the policy justifications of the rule, he added
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The Effect of the Legal Information Explosion

The phenomemon of a broad general rule adopted simultaneously
with numerous exceptions can be traced in part to the legal information
explosion in the early nineteenth century. In sharp contrast to the paucity and unreliability of reported cases in the eighteenth century, by
1830 every state had an official reporter system, and lawyers in every
jurisdiction struggled with a flood of case authority for any particular
legal proposition.1"' As impressive as the reports were the proliferating
new legal periodicals. x'4 A major function of these journals was to place
recent decisions before lawyers even faster than the reports could.""
These new sources gave lawyers and judges a wealth of data from
which to glean the "correct" result in any case, but no corresponding
theory which would help in choosing between the authorities because,
in theory, there should have been no conflict. Precise theories of precedent and stare decisis are creatures of the late nineteenth century."42
Before then, it was not clear when one court was bound to follow the
decision of another; it was even less clear when a decision of a "foreign" jurisdiction was so authoritative as to be "persuasive," if not
binding. 4"
he "could not forbear to state, that we have always had similar difficulties... in regard
to the justice, or policy of the rule" and noted that he thought there ought to be some
"discretion and reserve ... in the application of the rule." Redfield was cited by those
judges who wished to narrow the rule. See, e.g., Indianapolis & C.R.R. v. Love, 10
Ind. 554, 557 (1858). See generally Cleveland, C. & C.R.R. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 201,
228 (1854) (Warden, J., dissenting).
139 See, e.g., Story, supra note 55, at 213 (Story pointed with pride to the "outpouring of reports, and their high quality." "The danger, indeed, seems to be not that
we shall hereafter want able reports, but that we shall be overwhelmed by their number and variety."); see also N. DANE, supra note 22, at iv; T. REEVE, supra note 22, at
iv; American Reports and Reporters, 22 AM. JURIST 108 (1840).
140 For example, this Review was founded as the American Law Register in 1852.
1
Bloomfield, Law and Politics: The Self-Image of the American Bar, 18301860, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 306, 309-10 (1968).
142 R. CROSS, supra note 35, at 20; see also Simpson, supra note 104. Simpson
notes that even today the "rules governing the use of authorities in legal argument" are
all "a very theological world, with mysteries similar to those which surround the doctrine of papal infallibility .... We all know that the practice of the courts is not at all
consistent in these matters. . . . All is reminiscent of the smile on the face of the
Cheshire cat." For courts attempting to determine the "authoritarian pecking order...
[t]here are no rules to deal with conundrums of this sort." Id. at 87; see also K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 77-91 (1960) (Llewellyn describes 64 possible ways to use precedent from "following" to "avoidance.").
143 The distinction between precedent that is binding and that which is merely
persuasive is confusing even now. See C.K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 260-61 (6th
ed. 1958); Simpson, supra note 104, at 76; see also Lewis, Precedent, 47 L. REv. Q.
411, 421 (1931). It was more so in the 18th and 19th centuries when precise rules had
yet to be formulated. On 18th century America, see Smith, New Light on the Doctrine
of Judicial Precedent in Early America: 1607-1776, in LEGAL THOUGHT IN THE
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In the early nineteenth century, attempts to order the conflicting
decisions which did in fact emerge from "twenty-five sovereignties," as
Dane noted, presented serious problems. 1 " Courts responded to the
need for stability and harmony, 145 the mass of conflicting case law, and
the absence of precise rules for ordering authorities by developing ad
hoc rules for judging the persuasive force of any particular "foreign"
46

case.1

The new sources of information accelerated preexisting trends.
Farwell, as noted before, was precisely the type of opinion that would
readily be followed. 4 7 As cases qualifying or rejecting Shaw's rule began to appear, the new legal information system showed that the myth
of common law harmony was increasingly intellectually untenable. By
widely disseminating the "exception" cases, the reporters and journals
gave impetus to those judges disposed not to follow Shaw's broad formulation of the rule.
C.

Ohio: The Superior Servant Exception

Ohio's acceptance of the Fellow Servant rule was so qualified, and
the exception it created so broad, that it was sometimes cited as a jurisdiction which had rejected the rule outright. 4 8 In fact, in the first such
case to come before the Ohio Supreme Court, Little Miami Railroad v.
Stevens,149 the divided court did reject the rule, the only early case to do
so. 1 50 The three opinions in the case present, in microcosm, the range of
judicial options open to courts in the 1850's when faced for the first
UNITED STATES UNDER CONTEMPORARY PRESSURES

(J. Hazard & W. Wagner eds.

1970).

See 1 N. DANE, supra note 22, at xiv-xv.
See, e.g., the admonition of Shaw himself, that although it was often immaterial which way a rule was fixed, it is of the greatest importance, that it be steadily
adhered to in order to "afford security." Shaw, supra note 111.
146 The Fellow Servant cases demonstrate the way the system worked. After authoritative English cases, often cited first, decisions of respected state courts (like those
of Massachusetts and New York) came next, occasionally yielding to citations of authoritative treatise writers like Joseph Story and Isaac Redfield. Next came lists of
citations from neighboring states, in no particular order. This ad hoc, unsystematic
approach to the problem of harmonizing conflicting state authority led, in part, to the
codification movement. See Story, supra note 55, at 214, 237. For a contemporary condemnation of this random citation pattern, see The Citing of Authorities, 8 AM. JURIST
111, 117 (1832).
147 See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
a Hard v. Vermont & Can. R.R., 32 Vt. 473, 479 (1860); 1. REDFIELD, supra
note 61, at 425 & n.6.
144

145

149 20 Ohio 415 (1851).

After Little Miami the Ohio Supreme Court implicitly, then explicitly, adopted
the Fellow Servant rule with the superior servant exception. See infra notes 177-88 and
accompanying text.
150
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time with a Fellow Servant question.
John Stevens was driving an eastbound train for the defendant
railroad company when the train collided with a westbound train also
owned by the Little Miami. As stated in the declaration, the plaintiff
was "violently crushed" and was "greatly scalded, bruised, lacerated,
hurt and wounded, and in consequence thereof became, and was sick,
sore, lame, and disordered."1'51 The collision occurred because of a
change in schedule of which the plaintiff was not informed but of
which
the
conductor-the
"commanding
officer"
of the
1
52
1
53
train -apparently was. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $3700.154
The lawyers' arguments on appeal gave little hint of the decision
that was to come. The defendant, predictably, relied on Story, Priestley,
and Farwell (in that order) for the proposition that the broad Fellow
Servant rule was "well settled. ' 15' Rather than arguing against the
rule, however, the plaintiff's counsel maintained that Stevens' case
ought to constitute an exception. 56
The majority opinion by Judge Caldwell was a model of the instrumental judicial style. Caldwell based his opinion not on precedent,
but on reason and policy. He began with the general rule, "founded in
reason," that a principal must be held responsible for the consequences
of any power he sets "in motion for his own benefit. ' 157 Such a rule
was supported by policy, he observed, for "it is necessary as a preventive of mischief, and a protection to [the] community. 1 58 Caldwell then
confronted directly the central Priestley and Farwell legal argument
that an employee's implied employment contract and his level of wages
encompassed his assumption of risk of a co-worker's negligence. "If the
party does contract in reference to the perils incident to the business,"
151 20 Ohio at 417.

Id. at 429.
"' The majority cited the testimony of an assistant in the engineering department
who stated that a time card showing the schedule change was given to the conductor,
but that "he kn[ew] of no card being delivered to Stevens." Id. at 430. In his concurring
opinion, Chief Judge Hitchcock stated that it was "doubtful" that either Stevens or the
conductor had been notified of the change, and he attributed the collision to the negligence of the railroad superintendent whose duty it was to notify the engineer and conductor of schedule changes. Id. at 437.
152

154

Id. at

417.

Id. at 422 ("It is well settled that the master is not liable for injuries sustained
by one workman or servant by the careless or negligent or unskillful act of another
workman or servant." (emphasis in original)).
156 Id. at 425 ("But we claim that this case at bar is within the exception admitted
by the very authorities cited against us.").
157 Id. at 431.
115 Id. at 432.
155
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Caldwell noted, "he will only be presumed to contract in reference to
such as necessarily attend it when conducted with ordinary care and
prudence. ' 159 "The employer has paid him no money for the right to
break his legs," he wrote scathingly, "or, as in this case, to empty on
him the contents of a boiler of scalding water." 6 0
Caldwell also rejected the policy argument employed in Priestley
and Farwell, that the adoption of the Fellow Servant rule would promote safety in the workplace by giving employees an incentive to be
watchful of their co-workers' misconduct and carelessness. 6 1 Caldwell
responded to this argument by stating that "we do not think it likely
that persons would be careless of their lives and persons or property"
solely because they had a cause of action against the employer for provable injuries. 162 "If men are influenced by such remote considerations
to be careless of what they are likely to be most careful about," he
concluded caustically, "it has never come under our observation." 6 3
Having discussed and disposed of Priestley and Farwell, Caldwell
declared himself not to be bound by them. Although he could easily
distinguish the case before him on its facts, he did not deign to do so.
"So far as those cases decide that a recovery cannot be had in a case
like the one now before the Court," he held, "we think they are contrary to the general principles of law and justice, and we cannot follow
them as precedents."' '
Caldwell's bold style was mirrored by an equally strong dissent by
Judge Spalding. Spalding, however, looked to the past for his judicial
model; his opinion would not have appeared out of place in any eighteenth-century report,165 He carefully canvassed the precedents and con159

Id.

160 Id.
161 Farwell, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 59 ("By these means, the safety of each will be
much more effectually secured, than could be done by a resort to the common employer
for indemnity in case of loss by the negligence of each other."); see Priestley, 150 Eng.
Rep. at 1033 (preventing the co-worker from recovering against the employer is "a
much better security against any injury the servant may sustain by the negligence of
others engaged under the same master than any recourse against his master for damages could possibly afford").

162

20 Ohio at 434.

Id.
Id. at 435. Caldwell's opinion, in its rejection of precedent and its dependence
on reason and social policy, precisely fits the Horwitz model. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10 and notes 50-51. See generally M. HoRwiTz, supra note 1, at 22-26.
165 Although Judge Spalding's opinion indicated a strong adherence to the traditional notion that courts are bound by precedent, cf. supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text, it should be noted that his rationale at least acknowledged public policy
considerations which Horwitz claims guided judges in the mid-nineteenth century.
Spalding stated, "The law thus settled is founded in wisdom, and on principles of
16s
316

public policy, adapted to our condition, and should not, therefore, be changed." 20
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cluded that "[tihe solemn adjudications of Courts of recognized authority should be followed," as "[t]here is nothing to distinguish this State
from others." 1 6 He direly cited Latin maxims to the effect that "even
when the reason of a rule cannot well be discerned, 'the wisdom of the
rule has in the end appeared, from the inconveniences that have followed the innovation.' "1167 The irony, of course, is that the American
rule which Spalding wished to protect against innovation was barely a
decade old.
The third opinion in Little Miami was that of Chief Judge Peter
Hitchcock, one of the great judges of his time. 68 Hitchcock, far from
following Caldwell's bold line, concurred in the judgment only. He was
deeply disturbed by Caldwell's approach, for, he noted, "[i]f this case
were, in its principal features," like Farwell or Priestley, "I should
hesitate long before I would consent to disregard those decisions." ' 9
"They were," he observed, "decisions made by highly respectable tribunals, and by men whose opinions are entitled to the highest considerations."' 70 Happily for Stevens, however, Hitchcock discerned a distinction that enabled him to decide for the plaintiff "without conflicting at
all with the authorities." '
Hitchcock began by finding that the accident was not caused by
either the engineer or conductor, but rather by "the superintendent of
the road."1' 7 He then stated that employees of the company "engaged
in making or repairing their road, or in running their cars," such as the
Ohio at 440 (emphasis added). Horwitz notes that one of the first steps taken by eighteenth and nineteenth century judges was to recognize that English precedent was based
on conditions different from those existing in American society. "[T]o follow 'arbitrary
rules' or 'arbitrary decisions' without understanding that they 'arose out of [a different]
state of society' would be 'certainly contrary to the principles of our government and
the spirit of our laws.'" M. HoRwrrz, supra note 1, at 25 (quoting from a 1793
dissertation by Vermont Chief Justice Nathaniel Chipman).
1 6 20 Ohio at 449.
167 Id. Spalding relied upon 'Jus dicere et non jus dare" ["to say what the law is,
not to make it"] and "omnis innovatis [sic] plus novitate perturbat, quam utilitate
prodest" ["every innovation occasions more harm by its novelty than benefit by its
utility"].
1" Peter Hitchcock was one of the great early nineteenth century judges. See L.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 118. Educated at Yale, he moved to Ohio in 1806. After a
full political career in the Ohio legislature and the United States Congress, he was
appointed a judge of the Ohio Supreme Court in 1819, and Chief Judge in 1831. He.
"retired" in 1851, at age 70, when Ohio's Supreme Court became an elective body. 9
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 77 (1932). As the Dictionary of American
Biography described his judicial style, "[hie had little reverence for rule and precedents
established under unlike conditions ..... " Id.
169 20 Ohio at 436.
170
171
171

Id.
Id.
Id. at 437; see supra note 153.
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plaintiff, are truly "servants" of the company.1"' The superintendent,
however, is an "agent" or "proper representative of the Company" and
is thus not an employee or servant.17 Hitchcock concluded that the
plaintiff should therefore recover because his "injury resulted from the
negligence of the Company itself, or of an agent whose duty it was to
give the notice" of the schedule change to the engineer and conductor,
17 5
and not from the negligence of a fellow servant or employee.
Hitchcock's opinion is significant because it is an example of the
preferred judicial response to an authoritative line of cases which, if
followed, would yield an inappropriate result. Rather than reject the
broad Fellow Servant rule, as Caldwell had done, Hitchcock sought to
exempt the particular case before him from its force. Courts that resisted the rule tended to do so by following Hitchcock's rather than
17 6
Caldwell's approach.
Hitchcock's strategy of distinguishing the case before him from the
strictures of the broad Fellow Servant rule was in fact adopted by the
Ohio Supreme Court in the next Fellow Servant case to come before
it.1 7 7 In Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati Railroad v. Keary17 8 the
plaintiff, a brakesman employed by the defendant, was "very seriously
and permanently injured" by a collision between a locomotive and train
owned by the defendant. 17 9 The evidence at trial indicated that the collision was caused by the negligence of either the conductor or the superintendent, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the
amount of $6,050.180 On appeal the railroad's counsel strongly urged
the reconsideration of Little Miami,8 ' but the majority of the supreme
court, speaking through newly elected Judge Ranney, reaffirmed that
17'
174

175

20 Ohio at 438 (emphasis deleted).

Id.
Id.

See generally infra notes 205-24 and accompanying text.
In 1851, a new Ohio constitution was adopted providing for popular election
of judges. The court which decided Cleveland, C. & C.R.R. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 201
(1854), the next Fellow Servant case to reach Ohio's Supreme Court, consisted of
elected judges and was without Hitchcock's services. Whatever effect the popular election of judges was intended to have, it resulted in an Ohio court which narrowed an
employer's liability for employee accidents.
176

177

178 3 Ohio St. 201 (1854).
179

Id. at 202.

180 Id. at 202-03.
181 The court stated that the railroad's counsel questioned the "correctness" of
Little Miami because "it was made by a divided court, and is claimed to be in conflict
with several cases decided elsewhere, by courts of acknowledged learning and ability."
Id. at 204. According to eighteenth-century dogma opinions by unanimous courts and
by well-respected tribunals were accorded more precedential weight because those
courts were more likely to have "discovered" the law correctly. See supra notes 105-06
and accompanying text.
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18 2
decision with "unqualified approval.
Despite this strong affirmation of Little Miami, the Keary court
nonetheless treated Priestley and Farwell in a manner far different than
had the Little Miami majority. Caldwell's majority opinion had ridiculed those precedents and rejected the Fellow Servant rule; the Keary
court, however, proceeded less boldly. Judge Ranney began by stating
that he entertained "the highest respect" for the Priestley and Farwell
courts, and would "hesitate long before [he] differed from them." 18 He
instead distinguished those precedents from the case before him: "While
we cannot approve all that is said in [Priestley and Farwell, neither] of
them has determined the question now before us. ' " Neither of these
precedents, he continued, held that the employer "is not liable for the
negligent and careless conduct of him to whom he delegates the power
of control and command over" the injured employee.185 Keary's result,
therefore, far from affirming Little Miami's rejection of the Fellow Servant rule, instead created created a "superior servant" exception. The
creation of the exception implied the acceptance of the general rule
itself.1 6
Ohio explicitly adopted the Fellow Servant rule in Whaalen v.
Mad River & Lake Erie Railroad,187 the next Fellow Servant case to
reach Ohio's Supreme Court. In Whaalen, the injured employee was
not a subordinate, but rather was employed in a department of the
railroad separate from that of the negligent employee. The rationale of
Little Miami and Keary covered this situation as well: if an employee
could not assume risks of a superior's negligence because he was unaware of or had no means of avoiding the danger, he certainly could not
do so when he was not even in communication with the negligent party.
Yet, in a highly technical opinion, the court ignored that rationale and
held that Ohio's "superior servant" exception applied only to superiors
who negligently caused injury to subordinate employees. By 1858,

3 Ohio St. at 204.
Id. at 212.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 217.
188 Justice Warden, who concurred in the judgment, clearly saw the implications
of Keary.
182

183

[T]he ground on which I would place the right of the plaintiff below, is so
much broader than that taken by the majority of the court, that, in view of
the construction which will be given to their ruling, and what appear to
me its consequences, I feel bound to state my qualified dissent ....
Id. at 219. The shift in Keary was so subtle, and the policy denunciation of the rule so
strong, that Keary continued to be cited as a case contrary to the rule. See, e.g., I.
REDFIELD, supra note 61, at 388 n.6.
187 8 Ohio St. 249 (1858).
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therefore, in the interests of judicial harmony,"" the Ohio court had
turned an expansive, policy-based rejection of the Fellow Servant rule
into a narrowly defined "superior servant" exception.
Even at its narrowest, however, the exception represented a significant departure from Farwell's broad statement of the rule. Given the
hierarchical nature of railroad organization, " 9 the superior servant exception imposed liability on the railroad in a significant number of
cases. The fact that the limitation on the rule was couched in terms of
an exception, therefore, should not obscure the fact that its development
represented a considerable expression of judicial dissent from the rule.
D.

Indiana: The Separate Department Exception

Indiana's qualification of the Fellow Servant rule became the
"separate department" exception. In 1860, an Iowa court, when first
considering the Fellow Servant rule, criticized Indiana for its "innovation of an established rule."1 ' ° In fact, Indiana's "innovation" arose in
its case of first impression, Gillenwater v. The Madison & Indianapolis Railroad."'1
In Gillenwater,the plaintiff was a carpenter employed by the railroad to build a bridge.1 92 As he rode the train to his workplace, the
negligence of the engineer and conductor caused a derailment of the
train. According to the plaintiff's declaration, the mishap resulted in the
fracturing of his right hand, "so as forever to disable him from pursuing his business of housecarpenter."' 93 In their answer, the defendants
argued that the negligent servants were "competent and skilful," and
that as a fellow servant of the engineer and conductor, the plaintiff
should not recover. 9 ' The trial court sustained a general demurrer in
favor of the railroad.
In reviewing this decision, Justice Stuart, speaking for a unanimous supreme court, began by discussing critically the decisions adopting the Fellow Servant rule. Stuart was particularly dubious of Far"" The court's concern to narrow the gap between Ohio's rule and the current of
judicial opinion is a major theme of the opinion.
189 The stratification was explicit: superintendent over trackmen; conductor over
engineer; engineer over brakemen and firemen. See S. SALSBURY, supra note 80, at
112-13.
190 Sullivan v. Mississippi & Mo. R.R., 11 Iowa 421, 425 (1860).
1'915 Ind. 339 (1854).
192 The quasi-employee status of the plaintiff lent credence to the court's attempt
to distinguish the case from the authorities, in that he could have been viewed as a
passenger, and thus covered by respondeat.
119 5 Ind. at 340-41.
194 Id. at 341.
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well, noting that Shaw used very "cautious concluding language"
suitable "in relation to some legal heresy" which "strongly implie[d] a
195
suspicion of the correctness of the principle sought to be established.
Having expressed his reservations regarding the leading American
Fellow Servant case, Stuart had two courses open to him. He could
reject the rule, or he could follow Hitchcock's lead to distinguish the
case on its facts. The latter route was too tempting. "So clearly is the
case at bar distinguished from the Farwell case," he observed, "that we
are not called upon either to approve or dissent from the doctrine there
held."19' 6 In Farwell, as in Priestley, the employees were "intimately
associated in the business,""9 7 whereas in Gillenwater,the plaintiff was
in a "remote" department if, indeed, he was an employee at all. He
was, in any event, unconnected with the "careless management" which
had injured him.19 Farwell, the court held, must be strictly limited to
those situations to which its implied contract and assumption of risk
rationales applied, namely, those in which the servant was aware of the
possibility of a colleague's negligence and could act to avert an injury.
To extend the rule to employees of different departments, he observed,
would be "vicious and absurd." 9 ' Thus was born Indiana's "separate
department" exception. °°
The court confirmed its rule in Fitzpatrick v. New Albany & Sa201 the next Fellow Servant case to come before it. Here,
lem Railroad,
19. Id. at 346-47. Shaw's "cautious concluding language" was, in reality, an attempt by Shaw to dot his "i's" on the outer limits of his rule. Having encompassed
virtually all master/servant relations under the broad language of his rule, he added "a
caution against any hasty conclusion as to the application of this rule to a case not fully
within the same principle." He then drew his line at a master's duty to furnish an
employee with nondefective equipment (burden of proof on the plaintiff). 45 Mass. (4
Met.) at 62.
19' 5 Ind. at 344.
119

Id. at 343.

"I8Id. at 345. Gillenwater's status-employee or independent contractor-was not
made clear in the opinion. The court, however, treated him as an employee which in
turn bound the court to deal with his case as a Fellow Servant problem. In the next
Fellow Servant case, the court's discussion of the Gillenwater precedent indicated it
believed the plaintiff there to have been an independent contractor, but it believed the
Gillenwater 'separate department' exception was fully applicable to employees nevertheless. See infra text accompanying notes 201-03.
199 5 Ind. at 345. Stuart concluded that even Farwell had "clearly admitted that
where the duties do in fact belong to different departments, a distinction should be
made." Id. This was a monumental misreading of Farwell. Shaw in fact used the language cited by Stuart to oppose any such "supposed distinction, on which it would be
extremely difficult to establish a practical rule." 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 60. Pierce attempted, without much success, to harmonize the two cases. See E. PIERCE, supra note
61, at 300 n.1.
200 The "separate department" exception was a popular one. See, e.g., Hough v.
Railway Co., 100 U.S. 214, 217 (1879).
201

7 Ind. 436 (1856).
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the injured party was definitely an employee, a track repairman, rather
than an independent contractor, who was injured by an engineer's negligence. The court recognized that the case could thus be distinguished
from Gillenwater on its facts, but it declined to do so. The court rejected Farwell'srationale by holding that an employee "can not be presumed to have contracted in reference to injuries inflicted on him by
negligence." 20 2 The principle of Gillenwater, the court therefore concluded, covered the case of the track repairman, as well as the railroad
carpenter.

203

The development of Indiana's rule was another example of the
effort to express judicial dissent within the constraints imposed by legal
norms of harmony and consistency. The result was a Fellow Servant
rule that lacked any legal coherence at all. The "separate department"
exception itself was a masterpiece of confusion, as Shaw had predicted
it would be.'"
E. Jurisprudence by Exception
Developments in Ohio and Indiana were not unique. As Fellow
Servant cases came before other jurisdictions, new "exceptions" were
created, often in cases of first impression. The variety of these exceptions was limited only by the varying factual contexts in which negligent employees could kill or maim their co-workers. In several southern
states, therefore, a "slave" exception developed. Courts rationalized the
exception by observing that slaves were neither free to leave their employment nor to report a white co-worker's negligence and thereby
avoid its consequences. 20 5 Similarly, when accidents occurred between
202

Id. at 439.

Id. at 440 ("There is really no difference in principle, between this and the
Gillenwater case, and we are inclined to adhere to that decision.").
204 See 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 60. Pierce noted in 1857, "[i]t
may not be easy to
state the principle which will distinguish in advance one department of service from
another, so that the employees in one are not to be considered the co-servants of persons
employed in another; but the distinction itself cannot well be denied." E. PIERCE, supra
note 61, at 305.
206 See, e.g., Scudder v. Woodbridge, 1 Ga. 195, 198 (1846), where Justice
Lumpkin noted that the "general doctrine ... may be correct," but "interest to the
owner, and humanity to the slave, forbid its application to any other than free white
agents." In the next Fellow Servant case to come before the Georgia high court, an
action by a father against the railroad for an injury to his son, the court cited Scudder
as having established the rule in Georgia. See Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349, 358
(1854). Compare Ponton v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 51 N.O. (6 Jones) 245, 247
(1858), in which Thomas Ruffin, another of the great 19th century judges, found that,
even if he disagreed with the Fellow Servant rule, "it would not have been possible to
resist the authority of such an array of consistent decisions of able courts" and held that
no distinction was to be made in the case of a slave.
2OS
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employees of a similar rank, some courts developed a "competent servant" exception, reasoning that no implied employment contract could
relieve a master of his obligation to hire competent employees, nor
could an employee assume the risk of a co-worker's incompetence. 208
When accidents occurred because of defective equipment, some courts
found a "warranty of safe equipment" exception, for it was the
master's duty to guarantee the safety of the equipment and the employees could not be expected to assume risks of which they were not
aware. 20 7 When, in 1879, the Supreme Court finally adopted the Fellow Servant rule, it did so in a very narrow way, listing no fewer than
four "well defined exceptions" resting "upon principles of justice, expediency, and public policy" by which the rule must be qualified.20 8
The combined effect of these exceptions, which were adopted variously by the different jurisdictions, was to rob the rule of much of its
economic effect since many railroad accidents were covered by one exception or another. Moreover, the opinions of the courts adopting the
exceptions demonstrate serioui -dissatisfaction with the policies and
premises of the Fellow Servant rule. The question then becomes, why
did they consistently carve out exceptions which ill served railroad interests, and which made no legal sense?
One reason for the pattern described above is intellectual. The system of precedent not only preserves the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking, but it reinforces the judge's own sense of the correctness of his
views. No person, even a judge, prefers to stand alone and exposed.
The effect of this phenomenon on the Fellow Servant rule was graphically demonstrated in Wisconsin, which, like Ohio, at first, rejected the
rule. In a lengthy opinion in Chamberlainv. Milwaukee & Mississippi
Railroad,0 9 Justice Paine criticized the entire range of Fellow Servant
cases, and the policies underlying them. He recognized that a great maSee Walker v. Boiling, 22 Ala. 294 (1853); Bassett v. Norwich & W.R.R., 19
MONTHLY LAW REP. (n.s. No. 9) 551, 554 (Super. Ct. Conn. 1857); Keegan v. Western R.R., 8 N.Y. 175, 180 (1853); Noyes v. Smith, 28 Vt. 59, 63 (1856). It should be
noted that in Farwell Shaw reserved ruling on the question whether the Fellow Servant
rule applied in cases in which the employer failed to hire "a person of suitable skill and
experience." 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 62.
207 See Harrison v. Cent. R.R, 31 N.J.L. 293 (1865); Noyes v. Smith, 28 Vt. 59,
63 (1856). It should be noted that in Farwell Shaw explicitly left open the question
"[w]hether, for instance, the employer would be responsible to an engineer for a loss
arising from a defective or ill-constructed steam engine." 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 62.
"I Hough v. Railway Co. 100 U.S. 213, 216-17 (1879). The exceptions were:
master's duty of due care; to provide safe equipment; to provide competent colleagues,
and the "separate department" exception. For previous hesitations, see Railroad Co. v.
Fort, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 553 (1873); Philadelphia & R.R.R. v. Derby, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 467 (1852).
209 11 Wis. 238 (1860).
208
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jority of them had decided that an employer should not be held liable.
But he conceived that a court must not only "count but... weigh the
cases, and by this test the majority do not always rule."'2 1 He recognized that both Ohio and Indiana had couched their opposition to the
rule in terms of exceptions, a tactic he believed was suggested "out of
deference to authorities, from which they did not care to depart, further
than the facts of the case made necessary." 21 ' Wisconsin, however,
would be more forthright. "We are satisfied, therefore, that the general
principles of the common law sustain [an employer's] liability, and that
those cases which have attempted to establish an exception [to respondeat], do not rest upon solid ground."2 2 The court thereupon reversed
the lower court, which had relied upon the rule, and remanded for a
new trial.
When the case came up again the next year, the court reversed
itself.2 13 Its reasons were clearly stated in the short opinion by Chief
Justice Dixon, who had been a member of the majority the year before.
The original judgment, he noted, had been "sustained by weighty and
powerful reasons," and he had not changed his views regarding its correctness.21 4 Nevertheless, he noted, in the intervening year, Ohio had
moved closer to the majority rule, and Wisconsin, therefore, "stands
alone." 2115 He had switched his vote, therefore, "more from that deference and respect which is always due to the enlightened and well considered opinions of others, than from any actual change in my own
views." "I think I am bound," he concluded, "to yield to this unbroken
current of judicial opinion. '"' 6
Wisconsin exemplifies the intellectual pressures weighing upon
judges who were disposed to dissent from the rule, pressures which
grew stronger as the number of jurisdictions adopting the rule grew.
Distinguishing the case before the court on its facts, and incidentally
creating new exceptions, was therefore a much more comfortable approach than outright rejection.
Such a course, moreover, was often the only one open to a court,
given the questions that the lawyers had presented to them for decision.
210 Id. at 250.
211 Id. at 251.
112 Id. at 256-57. Justice Cole, concurring, would have preferred to come to the
same conclusion through a narrow, technical analysis. His position was analogous to
that of Hitchcock in Little Miami. See supra text accompanying notes 168-76.
213 Mosely v. Chamberlain, 18 Wis. 700 (1865). The case was decided in 1861,
but appended to the 1865 official reports.
215

Id. at 705.
Id. at 706.

216

Id. at 705.
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In the cases of first impression considered in this Comment, no plaintiff's lawyer, save one, argued even in the alternative that a court
should reject the rule.2 17 This was true not only in the late 1850's when
the line of authorities had lengthened, but from the earliest cases.
Rather than contesting the rule itself, lawyers invariably argued that
their client's case constituted an exception. In Farwell itself, the plain2 18
tiff's lawyer did not question Priestley's holding or rationale.
The lawyers, of course, were simply doing their jobs-attempting
to gain a recovery for their clients with the least risk of a contrary
decision. 219 Their instinct to distinguish, rather than argue from principle, was a product of the practical, apprenticeship system of legal training that the vast majority of nineteenth-century lawyers had received.
Lawyers who learned their trade by copying precedents and forms,
rather than by studying underlying principles, were not likely to argue
that a court should take any wider view of a case than was required to
sustain the client's position.2 20
The courts, for their part, rarely reached out to decide questions
that counsel had not presented to them. 22 ' As Professor Greenleaf ad217 The exception was the plaintiff's lawyer in Little Miami, who argued strongly
for an extension of respondeat in a 48 page brief. 20 Ohio at 423. In Chamberlain v.
Milwaukee & Miss. R.R., 11 Wis. 238 (1860), the only other outright rejection of the
rule, the court pointedly remarked that the court in its prior consideration of the case, 7
Wis. 425 (1859), had never reached the question of the rule's correctness because the
point
seems not to have been contested there; probably for the reason that the
plaintiff's counsel relied on the peculiar facts of the case, to make it an
exception to the rule claimed, rather than on a denial of the rule itself.
Such being the case; the court was not called on to examine the question.
11 Wis. at 249-50.
218 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 51 (plaintiff's argument). See also the argument of the
plaintiff's lawyer in Scudder v. Woodbridge, 1 Ga. 195, 197 (1846), another early case:
"The general rule stated in McMullan [Murray] and Metcalf [Farwell] may be correct,
and yet we must see that the exceptions, in justice and reason, must be numerous."
219 In this manner of proceeding, they differ little from contemporary counterparts. When faced with a series of contrary precedents, the safest and surest method is
to distinguish. This practice exemplifies the "common feeling among lawyers ... that it
is not their business to be constructive but to operate the law as it is." A. WATSON,
supra note 16, at 121.
2 0 On the training of lawyers, see supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
221 Simpson, supra note 104, at 86; see also A. WATSON, supra note 16, at 121
("[T]he role of lawyers is central to legal development. The credit for legal progress
must largely be given to them."). Modern commentators put strict limits upon a judge's
ability to raise issues sua sponte. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Civil § 2369 (involuntary dismissal of action);
Jurisdiction § 3522 (want of jurisdiction); Jurisdiction § 4243 (abstention, generally)
(1982). While the rules were not as clear in the nineteenth century, the underlying
rationale, which stems from the very nature of the adversarial system, was fully appreciated. On the proper role of a judge in an adversarial system, see L. FULLER, THE
PROBLEM OF JURISPRUDENCE 706-07
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vised students entering Harvard in 1838, "[flew judges, in our country,
would deem it necessary to re-examine a cause, to discover what new
path was left unexplored" by the lawyers. 22
The judges who were called upon to decide whether the Fellow
Servant rule should be applied in their jurisdictions, therefore, rarely
were asked to consider whether the rule was correct, or the reasoning of
the authorities sound. At most, counsel requested them to rule that the
case of the particular plaintiff before them constituted an exception to
the general rule. If a judge disapproved of the Fellow Servant rule,
considering it incorrect in policy, or unsound in principle, then he and
a majority of his brethren would find for the plaintiff.22 " The immediate result would be the creation of a new "exception" to the Fellow
Servant rule,224 and the cumulative result was the creation of an inco" Greenleaf supra note 109, at 221; see also Metcalfs Reports, 7 LAw Rm'. 1,
9 (1844) (reviewing Metcalf's Massachusetts Reports) ("It is often impracticable to
ascertain the precise extent of the decision of the court, without knowing the grounds
upon which the case was placed, and which the attention of the court was directed.").
223 Exactly why these courts resisted the Fellow Servant rule is unclear. The reason may simply have been that these courts believed justice would be best served by
leaving the liability for very serious injuries, negligently inflicted by one employee upon
another, on the employer who was able to bear the cost, rather than upon the employee, who was not. Some jurists may also have believed that the employers bore a
certain moral responsibility for their maimed employees. As Lord Cockburn wrote for
the Scots Court of Sessions in Dixon v. Rankin, the case that rejected the English
Fellow Servant rule:
I am clear for adhering to our own rule, and to our own legal and practical habits. The new rule seemed to be recommended to us... on account
of its own inherent justice. This last recommendation fails with me, because I think that the justice of the thing is exactly in the opposite direction .... I can conceive some reasons for exempting the employer from
liability altogether; but not one for exempting him only when those who
act for him injure one of themselves. It rather seems to me that these are
the very persons who have the strongest claim upon him for reparation;
because they incur damage on his account.
14 D. 420, 426 (Scot.) (1852). This rationale was echoed in Keary, where the decision
was grounded in the "social duty and public policy," that those who employ forces for
their own benefit have a "duty to make reparation" if those forces cause harm. 3 Ohio
St. at 207. Compare supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
Similarly, it is significant that the opinions rejecting the rule tended to detail the
truly horrible injuries that railroad accidents inflicted. Thus, in Little Miami, Justice
Caldwell described at length Stevens's injuries: "Stevens was very much injured by
scalding; his recovery was doubtful for sometime, he was confined for months, and has
been injured for life." 20 Ohio at 430. Sympathy cannot be ruled out as a motivating
force. In Farwell, by way of contrast, Shaw never in his lengthy opinion alluded to the
serious injuries suffered by the plaintiff.
For whatever reasons individual jurists resisted the rule, however, such reasons
were by no means determinative of the manner in which they expressed that dissent.
The latter question has been the subject of this Comment.
224 A good example of a late creation of an exception is Tennessee. In Haynes v.
East Tenn. & Ga. R.R., 43 Tenn. 222 (1868) the body of the opinion is devoted to a
long denunciation of the rule which concludes, "upon an examination of the authorities
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herent legal rule, inconsistent from one jurisdiction to another.
CONCLUSION

The creation of the Fellow Servant rule provides a case study of
the nature of legal change in nineteenth-century America. If the process
by which it was created was typical, one must conclude that judicial
instrumentalism, which shaped legal rules to achieve economic and social goals, coexisted with and was tempered by intellectual norms
within the legal community which exerted a powerful pull toward formalism and stability. The interplay of both these forces produced the
Fellow Servant rule.
The rule was shaped by instrumentalist judges like Shaw of Massachusetts and Caldwell of Ohio, who responded to Fellow Servant
cases with legal rules which, though opposite in result, drew their rationale from the economic and social realities of an industrializing
society.
The spread of the rule from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, however,
was largely due to judges who were motivated primarily by intellectual
norms within the legal community. The history of the Fellow Servant
rule demonstrates that the impetus to formalism was inherent in, and
inseparable from, those norms, which placed a premium on short-range
precedential consistency at the expense of long-range policy goals. As
Simon Greenleaf explicated those norms to budding lawyers during the
supposed heyday of instrumentalism, rules of law were to be "steadily
adhered to," for "[tihe certainty and publicity of the rule are often of
more importance than the nature of the rule itself." "The doctrines of
the law," therefore, "as fixed and settled by a series of decisions, or as
declared by a single deliberate judgment, are not to be departed
from., 2

5

For a judge who responded to these norms, whether he adopted
the rule or dissented from it, the bounds of his autonomy were clearly
marked. Those judges who disagreed with the policies or premises of
the rule were limited by the legal techniques of distinguishing and excepting, which provided an acceptable way of harmonizing authoritative precedents in the short run, but created legal chaos in the long run.
Other commentators have similarly concluded that "instrumental"
cited, we are unable to see upon what principle a rule that seems to us not founded in
justice, nor common right should be upheld and maintained." 43 Tenn. at 227. Yet the
holding of the case is limited by the facts to the creation of a "superior servant" exception. A similar analysis in New Jersey, in Harrison v. Central R.R., 31 N.J.L. 293
(1865) led to the creation of a "master's duty of due care" exception.
'" Greenleaf supra note 109, at 220.
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and "formalist" styles of judicial reasoning coexisted, rather than replaced one another, in the early nineteenth century.226 If this pattern is
more general, therefore, future research should begin with the premise
that instrumentalism and formalism were coexisting alternatives, whose
interaction within one judicial system produced legal change by a process which has yet to be fully explained.
More specifically, the Fellow Servant cases indicate, at the least,
that certain of Horwitz's conclusions should be qualified. His periodization of judicial styles, in which instrumentalist judges replace and
then are replaced by formalist ones will not account for the pattern of
coexistence described above. Moreover, the theories to which the judges
resonded will not fit neatly into Horwitz's timeline. The cases suggest
that an exaggerated respect for English precedent and a belief in common law myths of harmony and judicial "discovery" persisted far into
the nineteenth century. Similarly, the underpinnings of judicial formalism, far from surfacing in the late nineteenth century, are inherent in a
precedential legal system and significantly influenced the judges who
adopted the Fellow Servant rule.
Finally, the development of the exceptions to the rule call into
question the economic determinists' conclusions about the purposive nature of legal change. Horwitz depicted a process in which judges,
armed with an instrumental conception of the power of law to aid the
entrepreneurial classes, consciously and purposefully shaped private
law to accomplish these ends. Yet the development of the Fellow Servant rule, with its contemporaneous creation of exceptions, was anything but purposive. Judges and lawyers created this misshapen rule
out of the immediate needs of the case at hand with little concern for
long-range consistency.
Once created, the rule remained on the books to enrich, as well as
confuse, lawyers, not because of any positive judicial desire to keep the
rule in place, but because of the powerful force of legal inertia. As one
scholar wrote,
the maker of legal rules is in practice in somewhat the same
position as the builder of an Atlantic liner: when he has built
it, he must put up with it. In most cases, it cannot be seriously altered for years to come. This conflict between the
226 See, e.g., Scheiber, supra note 50, at 8, whose study of the development of
American riparian law yielded the conclusion that "the picture was thus a mixed one in
the 1820-50 period-with 'instrumentalist' judges often invoking formalistic doctrine,
and the doctrinaire critics adducing instrumental arguments." On the contemporary
coexistence of these alternative styles of judicial reasoning, see Ursin, supra note 9.
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rational and the arbitrary is very old and seems inseparable
227
from law.

117

F. LAWSON, supra note 104, at 8.

